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I examine determinants of refugee return after conflicts. I argue that institutional 
constraints placed on the executive provide a credible commitment that signals to 
refugees that the conditions required for durable return will be created. This results in 
increased return flows for refugees. Further, when credible commitments are stronger 
in the country of origin than in the country of asylum, the level of return increases. 
Finally, I find that specific commitments made to refugees in the peace agreement do 
not lead to increased return because they are not credible without institutional 
constraints. Using data on returnees that has only recently been made available, along 
with network analysis and an original coding of the provisions in refugee agreements, 
statistical results are found to support this theory. An examination of cases in 
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Chapter 1: The World of Refugees and The Journey Home 
1.1 Introduction 
The world is currently experiencing the largest refugee crisis on record. As of January 
2015, the United Nations reported that 50.5 million people were displaced around the 
world (UNHCR Global Appeal 2016-2017). To address this crisis, most world leaders 
have sought to create peace in the conflict zones that have created these refugees. 
Indeed, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made such an argument on September 
30, 2015 before a high-level meeting on migration and refugee flows in New York. 
He exclaimed:  
Of course, the best solution for refugees is voluntarily returning home, in 
dignified and safe conditions. We must step up our work to prevent and stop 
wars and persecution. But we know that conflicts will not disappear overnight. 
More people will flee crisis, and people will keep moving in search of better 
opportunities. We must be better prepared. (Ki-moon, 30 September 2015)  
 
A public consensus has formed that stopping wars and persecution will allow for a 
solution to refugee crises – and returns home. In this view, ending wars should allow 
refugees to voluntarily return to their country of origin and to rebuild their 
livelihoods. However, the data shows that this is not always the case. The 
establishment of peace does not lead simply to refugee return, and a great deal of 
variation exists in the level of return even in peaceful post-conflict countries.  
 
I argue that this is because political problems often continue to exist. Governments 
can promise to address the concerns of returnees, yet they can easily break this 




costs of breaking promises, government institutions that punish executives for 
breaking promises provide a credible commitment to refugees that promises are more 
likely to be kept. Under these conditions, refugee return is more likely.  
 
Consider Sierra Leone’s peace agreement in 1999. Government institutions provided 
political accountability through relatively democratic institutions. In this context, the 
government followed through and created agencies tasked with assisting refugee 
return. Indeed returns occurred at a fairly high level in this post-conflict peace period. 
However, Djibouti’s peace agreement in 2001 also promised to assist in refugee 
return. Government institutions did not provide the same level of political 
accountability due to one party rule and a boycott by the opposition. In this context, 
promises were broken without consequence, and the government did not place its 
resources into assisting refugee return. As a result, almost no refugees returned to 
Djibouti. 
 
In this context, this research aims to assist policy makers and non-governmental 
organizations that seek to assist refugee return in post-conflict environments. Such 
research – it is hoped – should allow for the international community to place focus 
not just on peace, but also on the political solutions necessary to achieve durable 
solutions to refugee crises. 
 
The overall evidence shows that after governments make commitments to refugee 




While some post-conflict countries have seen returns that occur quickly and in large 
numbers, other countries have seen tepid returns and even an increase in number of 
refugees. Return is often a priority for asylum countries that hold refugees, and a 
priority for inclusion in peace agreements. Return is also often a priority for refugees 
themselves – in January 2016 the New York Times reported that the “vast majority” 
of Syrian refugees desire to return home after the war ends (White 2016). However, 
the evidence shows that some refugees continue to reside outside their home country 
after civil war, and some new refugees can be created even in the post-conflict period. 
 
This can be depicted graphically. The chart below shows cumulative refugee returns 
as a percentage of the amount of refugees originating from a country at the time of its 
peace agreement. The chart in Figure 1.1 shows that – while there is generally a shift 

















The end of the conflict is only the starting point in a complex and often difficult path 
towards a solution to displacement. Indeed, evidence shows that a number of 
problems face refugees who seek to return. First and foremost among these are 
housing, land, and property (HLP) issues. HLP rights are often in jeopardy after 
conflicts because houses have been destroyed, land taken, and property records lost 
(Leckie 2009; Leckie and Huggins 2011). Returning refugees face legal battles over 
their land amongst weak and sometimes nonexistent legal systems (Unruh and 
Williams 2013). Further, refugees face physical threats to their security from former 
combatants, government and non-government security forces, and unexploded 
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sanitation and education. And finally, refugees can face political disenfranchisement 
(Kibreab 2003; Chimni 2002). 
 
Further evidence from UN studies on return and reintegration conclude that returning 
refugees often face governments that do not have the political will to address returnee 
concerns. In a review of returns in Angola, Crisp, Riera, and Freitas (2008) find that 
the government had “limited interest” in devoting resources to returnees because they 
were thought to be associated with the former rebel group (12). 
…the repatriation and reintegration activities undertaken by UNHCR were of 
particular importance because all other actors in Angola – national and local 
governments, development agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations – 
were generally unable or unwilling to provide the same kind of services. 
(Crisp, Riera and Freitas 2008, 13) 
 
Examples such as this reinforce that returning refugees often face governments that 
are uninterested in assisting them, and that simply achieving peace is not the end of 
the road for returnees. 
 
I will argue that returns are not entirely explained by an end to violence or a creation 
of economic opportunity. I argue that returns are more likely to occur when credible 
political commitments are made to establish conditions that address the needs of 
refugees. If credible commitments are not made, refugees will not return. While some 
peace agreement refugee commitments are specific in their guarantees to returning 
refugees, others are not. Yet, regardless of the specificity of these commitments – I 




create signals to refugees that at least some of the conditions of difficulty that they 
face will be addressed and ameliorated. 
 
Organizations that aim to assist refugees such as the UNHCR and various NGOs play 
an important role in assisting refugees. Often these groups provide assistance where 
the government cannot or will not do so. By taking into account the realities of post-
conflict political environments, such organizations can better assist returnees. 
1.2 The Politics of Refugees 
Refugees differ from migrants in that – while migrants may cross borders for any 
number of reasons – refugees have a “well-founded fear” of persecution in their 
country of origin. The definition originates from the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. 
Refugees are unable to count on the protection of their country of nationality due to 
fear of persecution regarding race, religion, nationality, social groups or opinions 
(UNHCR 2015). For this reason, refugees are often referred to as “forcibly 
displaced”. Refugees are the responsibility of the international community. 
Signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention have a legal obligation to “protect 
refugees and their well-being” (White 2016). 
 
It is important to recognize that refugees represent this specific category of migration. 
In reporting movements of people or the number of displaced, mistakes can be made 
in describing different groups. People often are displaced by conflict but do not cross 
international borders when fleeing to safety. These people are termed “internally 




do not cross international borders and are still legally under the protection of their 
country of origin (UNHCR 2015). Further, asylum seekers are often confused with 
refugees. Asylum seekers are those who claim to be refugees, but haven’t had their 
claim “definitively evaluated” (UNHCR 2015). Those that seek asylum are evaluated 
and may be determined to be refugees. In this project I focus solely on refugees from 
conflict countries, those that have crossed international borders to seek protection 
from civil conflict. These often occur in mass movements in which the circumstances 
from which they are fleeing are quite evident (UNHCR 2015). 
 
At the time of this publication, the world is seeing the highest level of refugees since 
World War II. In 2015, the United Nations reported that nearly 60 million people 
were forced from their homes. To put this in perspective, 1 out of every 122 people 
alive in the world were forced to leave their home at some point (Zarracina 2015). 
War in Syria in particular created a massive wave of refugees that began to flow 
upwards into Europe. By September of 2015, world attention grew as a drowned 
toddler – Aylan Kurdi – was photographed on the coast of Turkey in early September.  
 
Yet the response in many countries shows the political difficulties that arise when 
addressing the flow of refugee movements. While the 1951 Refugee Convention 
requires countries to take in refugees, observers have noted that the cost of taking in 
refugees has grown while the benefits have diminished – many in the United States 
fear terrorism while many in Germany fear crime such as sexual assaults that were 




countries, assisting refugees has become a major policy concern over fears that 
terrorists could be among those seeking refuge. In fact, a major campaign issue in the 
2016 presidential election cycle in the United States has been a disagreement about 
whether or not to allow refugees from Syria into the United States. In November 
2015, 25 state governors in the United States publicly vowed to block resettlement of 
Syrian refugees in their states until the federal government could assure that they did 
not pose a threat (Healy and Bosman 2015).  
 
Yet resettlement in America and European countries and is not the most common way 
of resolving refugee crises for the United Nations. The most desirable of the three 
“durable solutions” advocated by the UN is voluntary return to country of origin. 
Other durable solutions include local integration and third-country resettlement 
(UNHCR 2004). With local integration, refugees are permanently settled into the 
community of asylum, where they sought refuge. With third-country resettlement, 
refugees are permanently settled in an alternative third country. Another key concept 
is refoulement. Refoulement is the forcible return of people to their country of origin. 
This has occurred for a number of reasons, including renewed conflict in areas of 
refugee asylum. Typically, voluntary repatriation is the preferred resolution to the 
crisis of displacement. Voluntary returns are discussed in terms of repatriation, 
resettlement, and reintegration – meaning that refugees must return home and resettle 
in their country of origin and reintegrate into society. This can be difficult due to the 




post-conflict society. Indeed, the focus of political and legal literature on return has 
been “just” and “dignified” returns (Bradley 2008).  
 
The central puzzle I seek to solve is why displacement persists in countries where 
return and reintegration is part of the post-conflict agreement. A reasonable 
expectation is that the signing and implementation of a peace agreement including 
refugee return will lower the level of displacement originating from a country. 
However, the data shows that this is not the case. About half of post-Cold War peace 
agreements have included some provisions to address refugees and the internally 
displaced; however, more than half of these continue to have a persistent 
displacement problem (Sert 2008). Why are some better able to provide durable 
solutions to displacement than others? Answers in the literature suggest that the level 
of violence and the level of economic opportunity may matter. Borrowing from 
theories of post-conflict peace duration, I add to these a new answer: credible 
commitments made by post-conflict political institutions.  
1.3 Refugee Returns as a Durable Solution 
The concept of refugee return as a durable solution to refugee crises is fairly new. 
Historically, refugees were most often permanently displaced and did not return home 
(Rogge 1994 in Allen & Morsink 1994, 21). The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) was established to assist refugees following World War II, 
yet the focus on the return of refugees was minimal until the 1980s (Chimni 1999; 
Black & Gent 2006). Up until that time, refugee return discussions focused mainly on 




integrated into countries other than their country of origin (Allen & Morsink 1994, 2-
3). Many refugees in Western countries originated from the communist East, and 
Western countries shared common cause with providing for them. The West scored 
political points by welcoming refugees from the Eastern bloc, conveying that “the 
Western way of life was better and more attractive than life behind the Iron Curtain” 
(Sengupta 2016). However, since the end of the Cold War, many countries have 
viewed hosting refugees as a burden (Black & Gent 2006). 
 
The change of focus since the end of the Cold War has led to an increased reliance on 
return as the preferred durable solution to refugee crises. Indeed, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees claimed that the 1990s would be a “decade of 
repatriation” (Black & Gent 2006). The UN General Assembly has mandated 
UNHCR to monitor returnees’ safety, to support national judicial efforts towards 
reconciliation, to support rehabilitation, reconstruction, development and 
reintegration for returning refugees (UNHCR 2004).  
 
With such a focus on return, the question then becomes how to achieve it. For the 
UNHCR, return is a durable solution when it is free and voluntary, and focuses on 
returnees’ safety and dignity (UNHCR 2004, 8). The literature on durable solutions 
largely agrees with these focus points. Findings suggest that in order to achieve a 
“sustainable” return for returned refugees, states must resolve four critical 
insecurities: (1) physical insecurity (2) social insecurity (3) legal insecurity and (4) 




conditions created for returnees can look very different across space. Physical 
security refers to the ability of returnees to be free from violence and improved 
overall security including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 
combatants and security sector reform processes. Social security refers to the 
reconciliation of differences and the equity of returnees in the community, 
conceptualized as post-conflict justice processes, amnesties, truth commissions, and 
reparations that foster reconciliation. Legal security refers to the political status of 
returnees – they must have full citizenship rights and not be legally barred from 
return. Finally, material security refers to the ability of returnees to access property 
and housing, much of which was destroyed or stripped from returnees when they 
were displaced (UNHCR 2004). These conditions consist of the basic needs that 
returnees require in order for their return to be lasting and viable as a livelihood. 
Without these conditions, further displacement is likely, and returnees are not 
considered fully “reintegrated”. Other scholars refer to these conditions as “just 
return” (Bradley 2008). These conditions can vary greatly among post-conflict 
countries. 
1.4 Refugee Returns in Peace Agreements 
Peace agreements that address refugee return issues are relatively new phenomena. In 
the context of an increase in international peace missions in the 1990s, refugee return 
has become a “central pillar” of peace processes. Refugee return has been a way to 
inspire confidence in peace-building programs (Black and Gent 2006). Recent 
research has examined the efficacy of peace agreements as a whole, suggesting that 




uncertainty about actions and tensions (Fortna 2003). However, no study has 
examined the specific aspects of refugee commitments and their ability to foster 
return. 
 
Thus, by “refugee agreements”, I am referring to the subset of the specific peace 
agreement that addresses the concerns of refugees and conditions of their return. 
Recent research shows that since the end of the cold war, about 30% of all peace 
agreements – including partial and dyadic agreements – included some form of 
provision for refugees specifically (Högbladh 2011). Projects such as the Peace 
Agreement Matrix provide data on the specific provisions of refugee agreements and 
their level of implementation (Joshi, Quinn and Regan 2015). Much variation exists 
in the type of guarantees provided and the level of implementation seen. While some 
refugee agreements span the course of several paragraphs outlining guarantees to 
returning refugees, others are vague, and cover only a few sentences acknowledging 
that return should occur.  
 
For analysis of the commitments made to refugees, I coded for specific refugee 
provisions in each peace agreement since 1989 using data from Joshi, Quinn and 
Regan (2015). Refugee return agreements come with a few broad themes. First, some 
refugee agreements attribute specific guarantees to returning refugees. These can be 
promises for political rights and documentation, return of property, access to 
resources, financial assistance, and guarantees of safety including clearing of 




may offer one or more of these guarantees. Second, refugee agreements often only 
state desired objectives such as physical safety, return, reintegration, and resettlement 
of refugees. Such provisions fall short of guaranteeing assistance but can vary in how 
far reaching their objectives are. Again, such objectives are not mutually exclusive. 
Refugee agreements may provide one or more objectives. Finally, refugee agreements 
may include provisions that establish specific refugee return implementation 
commissions, third party assistance  – often in the form of NGOs and UNHCR 
assistance – and time tables for enacting refugee provisions. These refugee 
agreements can range from specific to vague.  
 
My coding – which will be discussed in Chapter 5 – attempts to parse these 
differentiations. Forty-six percent of refugee agreements included specific security 
commitments for returnees. Fifty-eight percent included specific socioeconomic 
commitments such as financial or political commitments. The bulk – 45% – contained 
0-1 commitments, while only twelve percent contained more than 5 commitments.  
1.5 The State of the Literature on Return and My Approach  
This projects ties together literature from refugee, democratization, and post-conflict 
peace studies. In developing my theoretical expectations, I draw heavily from the 
literature in democratization that explores credible commitments made by elites to 
citizens. I apply these concepts to the study of commitments made by governments to 
refugees in post-conflict settings. While there is much research using the credible 
commitments mechanism that is focused on democratization and peace durability, 




conducted on refugee return are case study, or country specific explorations. I seek to 
contribute large-N statistical models to this literature. 
 
The refugee movement literature argues that violence and economic opportunity drive 
forced migration. I borrow from the democratization literature to add political 
institutions to the determinants of refugee return. While prior research has focused 
mainly on refugee outflows, I seek to apply knowledge from that field to refugee 
returns. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
1.6 The Argument 
My central argument is that credible commitments to the provisions in the refuge 
agreement lead to higher levels of refugee return. Credible commitments must be 
made through political institutions that contain strong constraints on the executive. 
The constraining institutions act as a credible commitment because they raise the cost 
of reneging and establish future policy stability in the area of refugee returns. Further, 
these institutions will act as a signal to refugees that return is viable. Importantly, I do 
not contend that the end of violence and the availability of economic opportunity no 
longer matter. Instead, I argue that these institutions provide an additional incentive to 
return. And thus, even in countries that remain peaceful we see variation. 
1.7 Outline of Sections 
I begin in Chapter 2 by establishing my theoretical expectations and hypotheses given 
the state of the literature. In Chapter 3 I present the descriptive evidence about 




intuition behind my theory and to provide examples. In Chapter 4 I turn to the 
empirical analysis of my theory. I test my hypotheses using datasets I compiled at the 
country year level and the dyad year level. This allows me to use network analysis. 
Chapter 5 then turns to a discussion of specific commitments that are made. I advance 
the argument that no specific commitment matters as much as its credibility. I 
conclude in Chapter 6, where I discuss the results in detail and consider the policy 








Chapter 2: An Institutional Theory of Displacement and Return 
2.1 Introduction 
Although many post-conflict peace agreements contain provisions for refugee return, 
returns do not always occur at high rates. In fact, the level of returns in post-conflict 
peace periods varies quite widely. Thus, these periods of peace do not explain all of 
the variation in refugee return. Simply establishing peace in the country of origin will 
not resolve refugee crises. I present a new argument: post-conflict countries attract 
refugee returns when their political institutions allow them to credibly commit to 
policies that favor returnees.  
 
By signing a peace agreement with returnee provisions, regime-owners have made 
promises to assist returnees in some form. These promises can range from physical 
safety upon return to allocation of property or money. Safety might require activities 
such as demining or increasing police presence. Property rights might require legal 
appointments, restitution rights, or access to new land. Such promises may differ, yet 
all promises require some allocation of resources to returnees. The problem is that 
such promises can be broken. Even if the regime-owner initially follows through on 
the promise, there is nothing to stop them from reneging when it becomes 
inconvenient to allocate resources to returnees. This is known in the literature as the 
credible commitment problem. The commitments made in peace agreements are not 





I will argue that these promises cannot be credible without political institutions that 
provide some form of punishment for reneging. Institutions that hold regime-owners 
in check via elections, veto powers, or opposition party votes, are able to provide 
credible commitments because of the increased cost of reneging. If the regime-owner 
reneges, elections can remove the leader, or opposition votes can strike down the 
policy. Importantly, these institutions provide the only means by which regime-
owners can establish credibility. Only institutions such as these provide punishment 
for broken promises. Without such punishment, there is no cost for broken promises. 
Therefore, I argue that the most important factor in determining refugee return in the 
post-conflict environment is not the achievement of peace, but the political 
environment. Political institutions that constrain the executive’s ability to renege on 
the promise provide credibility to the promise. Refugees have no other means by 
which they can be assured that return is viable. 
 
My approach examines refugee returns in terms of two main actors: the chief 
executive of the government and the group of refugees that exist outside the country. 
I borrow from the literature on democratization and peace durability to apply the 
mechanism of credible commitments to refugee return. Credible commitments made 
by democratic institutions foster favorable outcomes such as refugee return. In the 
chapter that follows, I outline the literature on democratic transitions and the 
mechanism of credible commitments. I then proceed to show how this structure can 
be applied in a way that allows for leverage in explaining refugee return. I examine 




2.2 Credible Commitments via Democratic Institutions 
The literature on transitions from nondemocracy to democracy adds a valuable 
framework to the study of refugee return. The literature establishes how democratic 
institutions provide the only means by which regime-owners can credibly commit to 
allocation of resources to the masses. I will apply this logic to allocation of resources 
for returning refugees. To develop my theory of refugee return, I borrow the concepts 
of political conflict, individual preferences, and credible commitment from the 
democratization literature. In this chapter I will describe the framework of the 
democratization literature that will set the stage for my theory of refugee return, and 
then turn to how its mechanisms can be applied to my theory. From this I develop 
observable hypotheses. Democratization is one of the main areas of study in the field 
of comparative politics, and my discussion here cannot be exhaustive. For a more 
complete survey of this literature see works such as Geddes (1999) or Coppedge 
(2014). I derive from the democratic transitions literature a theory to explain the 
politics of refugee return. I begin with a discussion of that literature, and then 
describe how it applies to refugees. 
 
Broadly speaking, transitions from nondemocracy to democracy can be 
conceptualized as a political conflict over access to resources. The power of the state 
is used to decide allocation of resources, and in doing so it creates winners and losers 
in the political system (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Because of this, the study of 
these transitions often focuses on broad societal groups. Indeed, Moore (1966) views 




classes. Moore famously argues that without a strong middle class there will be no 
democratization (1966). O’Donnell et al. (1986) argue that transitions to democracy 
come from political conflict between hardliners and softliners within the regime elite. 
Such conceptions abstract the conflict over political resources to a macro level 
involving broad societal groups, and can prove very useful to understanding 
transitions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) conceptualize those who rule 
nondemocracies as the elite, while those who rule in democracies are the majority of 
people. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that the important characteristic of 
democracies is that the “majority of the population is allowed to vote and express 
their preferences about policies” (17). Thus, democracies generally represent the 
interests of the majority, and represent political equality as compared to 
nondemocracies. Likewise, nondemocracies represent the preferences of the elite. 
Nondemocracies do not take into account the preferences of the majority. Thus, 
nondemocracies represent a situation of relative political inequality (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006, 17).  
 
This generalization about the level of political inequality is meant as a useful 
abstraction to develop theoretical expectations. However, it misses some important 
variation within democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Nondemocratic regimes can 
vary in their institutional make up. The type of nondemocratic regime can vary, 
whether it is rule by monarch, military dictator, or civilian dictator. Each of these 
nondemocratic regimes themselves can vary, with inclusion of various “nominally 




institutions can still exert some level of influence on the policies enacted by these 
regimes (Gandhi 2008). In this sense, nondemocracies are not all equivalent in terms 
of political inequality. Yet, they all share elite decision makers that aim policies at the 
elite coalition. Likewise, democracies vary in terms of majoritarian or proportional 
representation, as well as presidential versus parliamentary systems (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). Presidential systems concentrate more power in an elite 
figure, the president. However, the important takeaway from this literature is the 
conceptualization of the political conflict that exists over access to resources: it is 
between those groups that hold power and those who do not. It is between those who 
are winners and losers in the political system. This conceptualization will prove 
useful for the study of refugee return. Refugees are often disenfranchised and seek 
resources from those who hold power. 
  
The literature on democratic transitions also makes valuable use of the concept of 
rational choice economic preferences. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) assume that 
individuals prefer more income rather than less, fairness rather than unfairness, and 
also security rather than insecurity. Boix (2003) uses a similar framework. With these 
preferences, the elites that rule nondemocracies do not want to redistribute resources 
away from themselves, and the majority desires democracy precisely so that it can 
redistribute resources towards itself. For this reason, Boix (2003) argues that 
democracy comes about when redistributive pressures are lower: elites will only 
agree to democratize if the majority is relatively equal to it in terms of property. In a 




majority are less likely to require redistribution. The literature does not discount the 
fact that groups matter and can influence decision-making, but the fact that 
individuals have well defined preferences of which they are aware is a valuable 
framework for discussing democratization. I make use of this in my theory of refugee 
return in developing the preferences of the government and the returnees. 
 
One of the defining characteristics of this literature is the discussion of the 
commitment problem. The transition to democracy is a political conflict over who 
controls allocation of resources between the elites and the majority. On the one hand 
the elite have the power of the state, both in terms of physical force and of legal state 
institutions. On the other hand the majority has the threat of revolution in which they 
could upend this order and redistribute wealth in a more equitable fashion. 
Disagreement exists over at what point the majority demand or the elite offer 
democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Przeworski 1991). But at 
some point, demands are made for a more equal distribution of political resources. 
However, any promise by elites to redistribute resources towards the majority is not 
credible because of the time dynamic: there is a today and a tomorrow (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2006, 23). Faced with the threat of revolution, elites have a few 
options: repress, offer concessions while maintaining power, or giving up power 
through inclusion of citizens in a democracy. Repression may be desirable because it 
allows elites to maintain power “without having to make any concessions to the 
disenfranchised” (29). However, if repression fails and the revolution succeeds, this is 




Acemoglu and Robinson argue (2006), another option is to give citizens what they 
want today – redistribution of income or policies that favor the majority (26). The 
issue is that these promises are not credible. The threat of revolution may exist today, 
but if that threat subsists tomorrow, the incentive for elites to continue inclusive 
policies also subsists. A credible promise must change not only the distribution of 
power today, but also tomorrow. Thus, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that 
democracy comes when the concessions aren’t credible and the cost of repression is 
too high. Democratic institutions are the creation of a credible commitment to the 
majority. The political institutions of democracy create a credible commitment to 
concede political resources today, but also tomorrow. They do this because 
institutions have an overall tendency to persist. They persist because it is costly to 
overthrow democracy. Organizations that citizens participate in – such as political 
parties, trade unions, etc. – all invest in the democracy and so its overthrow would 
destroy these investments. This gives citizens the incentive to struggle to maintain 
democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 29).  
 
It is important to note that the level of commitment is largely centered around real 
constraints on the chief executive. The academic exploration of credible 
commitments has noted that the level of executive constraints varies even within 
democratic and nondemocratic systems. Some democratic institutions can be 
“structured to limit the power of the majority”, allowing elites to renege on some 
concessions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 34). Indeed, with fewer constraints on 




resulting in less redistribution towards the majority (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 
35). Boix (2003) argues that presidential systems offer executives greater power to 
confiscate assets than parliamentary systems, due to the concentration of power in the 
executive in presidential systems (15-16). Thus, commitments in these settings hinge 
on the constraints on the executive. I make use of this framework in my analysis of 
refugee return. 
 
A similar examination of credible commitments has been examined in 
nondemocracies. Nominally democratic institutions within nondemocracies have 
shown an ability to influence some policies, yet the issue is that government 
guarantees remain noncredible. The question, Gandhi (2006) argues, is whether 
institutions act as “real” constraints on executive power (186). She argues that 
executives in nondemocracies do not accept the legitimacy of any institutional 
constraints (186). As a result: 
…when conditions change such that [dictators] no longer need institutions to 
neutralize opposition and co-opt outsiders, dictators can abolish these 
institutions. Because these institutions have no means by which to challenge 
such moves, in the end, they do not constrain autocrats in the same way that 
institutions constrain democratic rulers. Nor can these institutions signify a 
completely credible commitment on the part of autocratic rulers. (187) 
 
Yet even while the promises are not credible, Gandhi finds that the presence of 
legislatures and parties even within dictatorships helps to achieve some level of 
transparency because it is a platform for announcing plans, as well as policy stability 
due to increased costs for arbitrary policy switching (2006, 182). Indeed, some form 
of institutionalization can have some effects in nondemocracy. Gehlbach and Keefer 




regime supporters” can create a credible commitment to investors in nondemocracies 
(2012, 634). The takeaway from this literature is the level of constraint on the 
executive matters. Whether there are ways to take recourse on an executive that 
reneges matters for forcing policy stability and commitment to policies. I will apply 
this to the commitments that governments make to returning refugees. 
 
The focus on credible commitments in post-conflict settings has focused mostly on 
the ability of warring factions to commit to peace. Warring parties need a credible 
commitment to peace or else they lack incentive to stop fighting. Even if both sides 
come to an agreement, peace is difficult to achieve due to lack of enforcement 
(Walter 1997, 1999). A post-conflict government may use its new power to repress 
the opposition group. Knowing this, the opposition groups are slow to disarm. This 
slow disarmament creates incentive for governments to maintain their militarization 
and to renege on their promises to peace. It gives incentive for the government to act 
against opposition groups that it may view as a threat (Posen 1993; Fearon 1995 
Walter 1999). In this context, credible commitments have mostly been examined in 
the form of physical power. For example, military victory can help to create a 
credible commitment to peace. With military victory, the loser is less likely to pose a 
threat because it has been defeated. The group that achieves military victory is thus 
less likely to view the defeated side as a threat and break its promise of peace 
(Licklider 1995; Atlas and Licklider 1999; Walter 1997). Third-party peacekeepers 
can also create credible commitments because they can create assurances that neither 





In regards to peace, democratic institutions are not necessarily viewed as the sole 
producer of credible commitments. Walter (1999) argues that post-conflict 
democratic institutions might be too “frail” to be able to make commitments to peace. 
New democracies may lack the institutional strength and civil society to foster 
peaceful participation in politics, and elections themselves may open the way for 
autocrats to “hijack” the process (Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Paris 2004; Clague et 
al. 1996). Established non-democracies, due to their stability, may provide greater 
guarantees of property rights than new democracies (Clague et al. 1996). However, 
not all evidence points in this direction. Well-designed democratic institutions that 
encourage coalition forming among parties and appropriate constraints on the 
executive may be able to overcome such challenges (Flores and Norruddin 2012; 
Cammett and Malesky 2012). Flores and Nooruddin (2012) argue three mechanisms 
might help this commitment problem in post-conflict contexts: security institutions, 
well-designed electoral infrastructure, and constraints on the executive (562). Again, 
emphasis on executive constraints appears to influence outcomes. It is this concept 
that I apply to my theory of refugee return.  
 
As an additional form of constraint on the executive, post-conflict peace literature has 
examined the effect of power sharing institutions. Power sharing institutions are 
found to address security concerns by giving groups assured access to government 
influence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2006; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005). Such 




influence. Power-sharing institutions generate signals of “conciliatory intent” to both 
parties, fostering a cooperative relationship (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005). The ability 
of power-sharing institutions to foster long-term peace is not without challenge. 
Roeder and Rothchild (2005) find that – while important to resolving the security 
dilemma in the short term – power-sharing institutions only inflame ethnic tensions 
by creating a political order along the very ethnic divisions that were part of the 
conflict. Instead, they argue that power-dividing institutions are more effective at 
consolidating a longer lasting peace. Power dividing institutions emphasize individual 
civil liberties, separation of powers, and checks and balances (Cammett and Malesky 
2012, f3 1010). Yet again – the focus is on the level of constraint on the chief 
executive. 
 
I borrow from this literature the concept of credible commitments and apply it to 
another important aspect that goes beyond democratization or peace in the post-
conflict environment. I focus on the commitments governments make to those 
displaced by the conflict. Countries that provide provisions for refugee return in their 
peace agreements are making a commitment to refugees. Refugee provisions make a 
number of commitments to refugees in the post-conflict episode. Not all are equal. 
While some are short and vague, others are long and detailed. Commitments include 
security guarantees, economic guarantees, and political guarantees. These provisions 
can vary widely, yet all share a common notion: that the return of refugees is 
welcome. However, these commitments are not credible without strong constraints on 




2.3 Refugee Incentives and Preferences 
The incentive to return to a country that was previously unable to provide security for 
its citizens is complicated in nature. Refugees often consist of the most vulnerable 
groups, and returning refugees are a subset of this group. Refugees are often those 
targeted in the conflict, and consist of women, children, elderly, and minority groups. 
Some research has examined why refugees return, and under what conditions they do 
so. The study of the determinants of return has been largely confined to smaller-scale 
case studies that examine the processes at a micro-level. Data from UNHCR suggest 
that returns do not always occur on a large scale. Explaining this variation is the task 
of this project. I first explore incentives that might encourage refugee return, and then 
explore incentives that might discourage it. Finally, I discuss preferences that 
refugees have given these expectations. Deriving expectations from the 
democratization literature, I expect that returning refugees have a defined set of 
preferences. Refugees prefer greater access to economic opportunity over less, more 
political rights over fewer, and conditions of physical security over lack of security.  
 
Indeed, previous research reinforces these preferences. Research finds that return is 
shaped by the economic opportunity – particularly assets such as access to land. If 
returning refugees have access to such assets in the reception or origin sites, return 
may be more likely (Deininger, Ibáñez, Querubin 2004; Klinthäll 2007). Much of the 
policy literature is focused on how to grant returning refugees precisely these: 
economic, political, and social guarantees of safety (UNHCR 2004 handbook). 




return when institutions such as property rights are strongest (Sert 2014). However – 
when considered in terms of refugees – such rights may also influence staying in the 
area of asylum. Kibreab (2003) finds that when countries of asylum offer refugees 
civil, social, and economic citizenship rights such as secure employment and social 
services, they are less likely to see return as a viable or desirable option (24). Thus – 
as will be discussed in detail in section 2.6 – the decision to return may be a product 
of where the refugee is seeking asylum. However, any economic incentives to return 
to the country of origin may be fleeting: in the context of post-conflict refugee 
situations, the same property was expropriated or had to be abandoned due to lack of 
protection during the conflict. In the absence of credible commitments to the 
protection of economic resources, refugees may not choose to return. 
 
Without a credible commitment to return assistance, conditions in the return area 
often provide an incentive not to return. Returning refugees face underlying issues 
such as reconciliation of grievances, instatement of property rights, removal of 
landmines and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of violent forces that 
are crucial for successful repatriation and reintegration (Black & Gent 2006; Chimni 
2002). Returnees face conflicts over property and housing because those that 
remained in the country during the war may have taken property. Under such 
conditions, returnees must seek justice within a weak legal system, and often lack the 
documentation to prove ownership due to the destruction caused by the conflict 
(Unruh and Williams 2013; Leckie 2009; Leckie and Huggins 2011). Such battles 




vulnerable households – such as those headed by women or minorities – are less 
likely to return (Hardgrove 2009). Further, refugees who faced higher levels of 
trauma during the conflict may be less likely to return (Sert 2008). Indeed, the 
majority of evidence suggests that the main driver of forced migration in the first 
place is violence and a fear for physical safety (Adhikari 2013, Davenport, Moore, 
and Poe 2003; Edwards 2009; Melander and Öberg 2006; Melander, Öberg, and Hall 
2009; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Schmeidl 1997; Zolberg, Suhrke, and 
Aguayo 1989). 
 
These conditions will inform the preferences that returnees have. Given their 
vulnerabilities and experiences, I expect that returning refugees seek security, 
political rights and economic access. Refugees make the decision to return in regard 
to the information they have about the area of return. Thus, they can make the 
decision to return given these options: 
1) Settle where there is physical, economic and political security 
 
2) Settle where there is some physical, economic or political security – 
but not guaranteed / is uncertain 
 
3) Settle where there is a threat to physical economic and political 
security. 
 
I assume that refugees prefer option (1) over option (2), and option (2) over option 
(3). If refugees choose option (1), the conditions of vulnerability in which they exist 
are most likely to be addressed. With physical safety, refugees alleviate the threat that 
caused them to flee, and with economic security, refugees can create livelihoods. 




settle. Such guarantees allow returning refugees to overcome the challenges they face 
in return. If refugees choose option (2), at least some of the conditions of 
vulnerability in which they exist might be addressed. This is often the only option, but 
it is preferable to option (3). In option (2), refugees may be hedging their bets that the 
conditions will improve over time and that at least some form of security will be 
addressed. I assume that it is unlikely that refugees would choose option (3), as this is 
the reason they have fled in the first place. However, this may occur due to no 
alternative options. With option (3), refugees face threats to physical security, lack of 
economic opportunity, and political rights. 
 
Given these options, I assume that refugees will choose option (1), due to the higher 
likelihood of achieving a livelihood. Thus, refugees will make the decision to return, 
resettle, or stay based on the likelihood of achieving the highest amount of option (1). 
In the theory that follows, I expect that returnee preferences are always option (1) 
over option (2) and option (2) over option (3). In order to achieve the highest level of 
option (1), refugees will make decisions based on the level of commitment to actually 
receiving such resources. I expect that credible commitments via institutions that 
constrain the executive create signals to returnees that promises to distribute physical, 
economic and political security will be met. 
 
2.4 Government Incentives and Preferences 
In the analysis of the government incentives and preferences, I am referring to the 




president, prime minister, or dictator. The nature of the executive can vary across 
regimes. In parliamentary regimes, the chief executive is often described as part of a 
collective group as opposed to a presidential system, where the chief executive is 
often described as an individual. The chief executive may have direct lawmaking 
powers or merely “considerable” powers (Cheibub et al 2010, 80).  However, for the 
sake of this analysis, the chief executive is considered to have one set of preferences, 
similar to analyses of democratization in which researchers view the regime elites 
with one set of preferences. Of course, it is possible for splits to exist within the 
regime elite, but this analysis considers the chief executive as having one set of 
preferences. 
 
Post-conflict governments are unique in that they face strong incentives to quickly 
consolidate political power, establish security throughout their borders and grow 
economically so as to rebuild. This environment shapes the preferences that 
governments have regarding refugee return after conflicts as opposed to after natural 
disasters. Post-conflict governments must often weigh the costs of establishing 
capacity in political, economic, or security areas over concerns for returnees. Thus, 
deriving post-conflict government incentives from the democratization and peace-
durability literature, I expect that chief executives in the government will prefer more 
economic resources for projects that favor their constituents rather than less. I expect 
this regardless of regime type: authoritarians prefer to consolidate economic resources 
among the winning coalition much the way that democrats do. The difference is that 




suggests that this is the case (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). I also expect that chief 
executives will prefer a higher level of physical safety rather than a lower level. 
Indeed, evidence shows that governments attempt to achieve this in a number of 
ways, including processes of demobilization of warring factions or through coup 
proofing (Quinlivan 1999). Finally, I expect that chief executives prefer to 
consolidate their political power in their respective institutional system. Democratic 
leaders seek to shore up voter support, while authoritarian leaders seek to establish 
their hold on power. Post-conflict governments are transitioning from a period in 
which they were unable to provide basic guarantees of safety to their citizens – so the 
extension of resources to refugees is the result of a balance in these forces.  
 
Finally, I note that I do not seek to explain the reasons why governments choose to 
extend credible commitments. These could be complicated in nature: democratic, 
executive constraining institutions may have already existed due to previous forces 
that lead to democratic transition, or to the forces at play in the peace process. 
Additionally, governments may make a commitment to refugee return because they 
see it as a human rights obligation. Recent theoretical work makes the case that post-
conflict governments have an obligation to create the conditions for return out of 
respect to the human rights or refugees and as reparations for the wrongs that were 
done to refugees during the conflict, as well as the hardships that they faced both in 
exile and return (Souter 2014; Bradley 2008; Amirthalingam & Lakshman 2013; 
Aysa-Lastra 2011; Kaun 2008; Romana 2005). Due to pressure in this regard, 




considers durable solutions to displacement: physical, social, legal, political, and 
economic security guarantees (UNHCR 2004). However, this incentive is not a 
credible commitment in itself. Even if governments are convinced to see refugee 
return as a human rights obligation, there is no mechanism to enforce that they 
undertake actions to create the conditions for return. While international and public 
pressure may give the government incentive to commit to refugee return while 
signing the peace agreement or in the days immediately following the conflict, such 
pressure may diminish over time, and with that diminishment the government can 
renege on its commitment without consequence. Thus, I focus only on whether the 
government has made a credible commitment or not made one. This focus is aimed to 
allow policy makers to understand the realities on the ground during post-conflict 
refugee crises. 
 
Governments may also commit to refugee return because they see it as an integral 
part of the peace process. Research suggests that durable solutions to refugee crises 
must be found as a way to stem further violence and foster economic recovery. 
Indeed, reintegration of former combatants is tied to lower post-conflict hostility and 
is thus a major part of many peace operations (Annan et al 2011; Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2007). Regarding reintegration of refugees in particular, evidence suggests 
that lack of integration of refugees may be a source of international conflict due to the 
ability of refugee camps to produce warriors and exacerbate conflict (Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2008). Some evidence suggests that a durable peace requires refugee 




that refugee repatriation itself is not a necessary condition for durable peace but that 
the refugee issue must be resolved through other means, or else “refugee warriors” 
may develop (Adelman 2002, 273). In this way, providing for refugee return may be a 
practical course of action for post-conflict governments to maintain security. 
However, such incentive is again not itself a credible commitment. As soon as the 
threat of conflict subsides, the government no longer faces the incentive to contribute 
to returnee needs because they no longer face a threat. As peace becomes more likely, 
the commitment to returnees becomes less needed. 
 
Ethnicity might also play a role in the desire of governments to create credible 
commitments to refugees. If refugees are mainly coethnics with those in government 
power, then the government should have an incentive to create a credible 
commitment to returnees through the use of institutions that guarantee stability 
towards policy. However, as strong as ethnic ties may be, ethnicity itself cannot act as 
a credible commitment. Ethnicity does not provide a constraint on the executive itself. 
No matter how unpopular with fellow coethnics, the executive is still free to renege 
on promises to returnees when institutions lack constraining power. This makes sense 
particularly if one considers that the executive only needs the support of the winning 
coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, ethnicity may be a reason why a 
government extends institutional inclusion – but it does not itself provide a credible 





Non-constrained Executive Options 
I first consider the options and expected payoffs in regards to a non-constrained 
executive. With these preferences, non-constrained executives have two basic options 
in regard to the commitments they made to refugee return: (1) adhere or (2) renege.  
 
If governments adhere to the commitments they made, they must take on the cost of 
doing so. Costs include that of establishing security, clearing landmines, and 
demobilizing fighters. Costs include allocation of resources towards basic 
infrastructure services like health, sanitation and education. Costs may also exist in a 
strain on the legal system due to property disputes amongst returning refugees. 
Politically, governments may not have much to gain. Returning refugees may upset 
the political balance in place at the end of the conflict, and returning refugees may 
have political grievances against the government. 
 
Economically, investment during the conflict is often low due to fears of damage or 
expropriation of property by force, and often continues to remain low or decline in 
the post-conflict period (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003; Blomberg and Hess 2002; 
Collier 1999; Gupta et al. 2004; Imai and Weinstein 2000; Kang and Meernik 2005; 
Koubi 2005; Mohammed 1999; Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Flores & Nooruddin 
2009). Thus, with limited post-conflict economic resources, any returning refugees 
can pose a threat to property gained or resources won during the conflict. In line with 
the expectations from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), governments often choose to 




Examining UNHCR’s work on return in Angola, for example, Crisp, Riera & Freitas 
(2008) find that the Angolan government chose to put post-conflict resources towards 
oil and urban development rather than towards returnees that were perceived to be 
former supporters of the rebel group (12).  
 
Governments can also experience an incentive to renege if returnees threaten the 
political balance. Post-conflict elections are becoming increasingly common – with 
the number more than doubling between the 1980s and 1990s (Flores and Noruddin 
2009). At conflict termination, the political balance in the country was set without the 
inclusion of refugees. Returning refugees thus may upset the political balance. They 
may contribute or detract from a party’s ability to retain power. Thus, governments 
may choose to ignore the issues facing returnees up to and including not giving 
documentation, land, or political rights to returnees.  
 
And finally, refugees may expand rebel networks, and their presence in border camps 
can increase the risk of further conflict (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). Thus, 
governments may fear that these same refugees – when returning – will pose a threat 
to security. Such fear of refugee warriors has recently become a concern with 
refugees originating from Syria in the United States. For this reason, governments 
may prefer not to commit to refugee return. That is why strong institutions hold them 






For these reasons, it is most likely that the government – without constraining 
institutions – will choose to (2) renege. Faced with the economic costs, non-
constrained executives should choose to place limited resources towards those in their 
winning coalition. Because refugees are not part of the group that put the executive in 
power, they are not part of this group in non-constrained countries. Faced with the 
political instability that returns might cause and the threat of possible security issues, 




Governments also face incentives to renege on refugee return commitments. These 
reasons may be economic, political, or security based.  
 
Constrained Executive Options 
I next consider how the inclusion of constraints on the executive changes the 
preferred choice, and thus leads to a credible commitment. Again, the executive has 
two basic options in regards to the commitments made in the refugee agreement: (1) 
adhere or (2) renege. 
 
With a constrained executive, the costs associated with adhering are no longer simply 
economic. Now, executives face political punishment if they renege. Political costs 
can be even more costly than economic ones for politicians, since the result is the loss 




adhering to the guarantees in the refugee agreement, they now have to weigh them 
against political costs.   
 
Here it is helpful to consider the costs with a payoff box. I make a few assumptions to 
inform my expectations. I assume that politicians seek to gain and hold office first 
and foremost. I assume that political costs are greater than economic costs since the 
ultimate goal of politicians is to stay in power. Similar to the democratization 
literature, I contend that losing political power is the worst-case scenario for elites 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a politician 
would incur economic costs in order to stay in power. Therefore, in my discussion of 
payoffs I make representation of this concept by assigning economic advantages a 
value of (1) and political advantages a value of (2). Table 1 illustrates this logic using 
political and economic payoffs. 
Table 2.1 




Adhere Economically costly, 
Politically no cost to 
executive 
Payoff = 2 
Economically costly, 
Politically necessary 
Payoff = 2 
Renege (No action) Economically not costly, 
Politically no cost to 
executive 
Payoff = 3 
Economically not costly 
Politically costly 
Payoff = 1 
 
 
Each scenario has the possibility of 3 points: 2 for political advantages and 1 for 
economic advantage. The government preferences without executive constraints are 




because it is economically costly (-1) but not politically threatening since there are no 
constraining institutions (+2). Doing nothing results in a payoff of 3 because it is not 
economically costly (+1) and again incurs no political costs (+2).  
 
Introducing political constraints changes these payoffs. By introducing political 
constraints on the executive, the payoff for creating the conditions is now 2 because it 
is politically necessary for survival (+2) even while being economically costly (-1). 
The payoff for doing nothing now drops to 1, because doing nothing is now 
politically costly (-2) even if it is economically advantageous (+1). Here enters the 
major distinction: introducing political institutions that constrain the executive 
increases the political cost of reneging and decreases the political cost of adhering. 
Thus, introducing constraints on the executive results in altered preferences, and 
creates a more credible commitment to returns.  
 
2.5 Return Hypotheses: By Country of Origin 
I now use these expected payoffs given institutional constraints to develop hypotheses 
about refugee return. Government commitments in the refugee agreement to provide 
displaced populations with the economic, political and physical security guarantees 
are subject to change after refugees return, or after the government comes to power. A 
government may come to power promising to act inclusively and protect the concerns 
of returning refugees, but it is free to change its priorities at a later time. Borrowing 
from the literature, I argue that the existence of direct elections, strong legislatures, 




commitment to provide stability in terms of the refugee agreement, and can provide 
signals to refugees that the refugee agreement will be implemented. Such institutions 
punish executives if they renege on commitments to refugees. Thus, such institutions 
should result in greater levels of refugee return. Similar to the way institutions 
provide credible commitments to distribute resources towards the majority of people 
in the process of democratization, these institutions transmit information that commits 
governments to distributing required resources towards refugees upon their return.  
 
Informed by the literature on credible commitments, I expect specific constraints – 
direct executive elections, independent legislatures, and power sharing arrangements 
– to matter. First, consider direct constraints on the executive. As recalled from that 
literature, democratic elections for executive office with a credible opposition 
produce audience costs for executives. If an executive reneges on the promise to 
create conditions of return, the executive may be elected out of office. This makes it 
more difficult for leaders to change policy radically from what they promise, and 
forces them to commit to the refugee agreement. Such elections also signal to the 
refugee population that the government is less likely to renege on promises of 
physical, political, or economic security because doing so would subject them to a 
harsh response at the polls.  
 
Independent legislatures also place audience costs on the executive, forcing 
accountability to the policies promised and placing costs on reneging from the 




through their ability to hold the executive accountable by increasing audience costs 
and ultimately acting as a veto player during the election.  
 
Further, the inclusion of a hard veto player acts as a serious constraint on executive 
power. Power-sharing arrangements include the opposition in a definite position of 
power, making this an added veto player. This should increase the accountability of 
the executive to adherence to the agreement and should provide stability in the form 
of a veto on both sides. Borrowing from the power-sharing literature on peace 
durability, I thus hypothesize that power sharing will influence displacement 
solutions durability through the mechanisms of accountability and inclusion of 
opposition veto. 
 
I contend that returnees respond to signals as to the way they will be treated in the 
new government. Even if refugees want to return, they will not do so if they fear that 
their return will only result in another round of displacement. In addition to 
information about the end of violence and the economic opportunities in the area of 
origin, displaced people will react to information about the inclusiveness of 
government institutions so as to improve their chances of reintegrating successfully. I 
assume that refugees will always prefer guarantees of physical, economic and 
political security. Thus, returns are more likely with constraining institutions since 
constraining institutions are more likely to create these guarantees due to the 
government’s incentive structure. Return is high risk without institutions that 




refugees originally left because the government was unable to provide them with 
safety, and thus return to this land is risky.  
 
When considered in terms of the country of origin’s institutional makeup, these 
expectations provide for three main observable hypotheses:  
1a) In home countries with direct election of the executive, the level of refugee 
returns will be higher than in home countries without direct election of the 
executive. 
 
1b) In home countries with more independent legislatures, the level of refugee 
returns will be higher than in home countries without independent legislatures. 
 
1c) In home countries with power-sharing arrangements, the level of refugee 
returns will be higher than in home countries without power-sharing 
arrangements. 
 
2.6 Return Hypotheses: By Dyad 
To further explore refugee return, I alter the preference expectations for returning 
refugees by introducing the incentives and constraints that they face in their country 
of asylum. Including information about the country of asylum is important because 
evidence suggests that the experience in the country of asylum can affect the decision 
to return. Fagen (2011) argues that many refugees will reject the option to return 
home if the education or health services are lower than what they have at the refugee 
camp. If this is backed by a credible commitment by the asylum country to maintain 
such policies, refugees may prefer not to return home. Thus, the conditions in the 






The country of asylum is the country to where refugees have fled in the wake of the 
conflict. This is the country from which they will return, if they are to return. The 
country of origin is the home country; this is the country where they had originally 
fled from and where they will return to if they are to go home. The commitments 
from each country remain the same. Countries of asylum can credibly commit to 
continuing to offer safety if constraining institutions signal policy stability to 
refugees. However, countries of origin can credibly commit to the refugee return 
agreement if constraining institutions signal that it is unlikely to renege.  
 
Refugees face the same economic and political costs of return. However, the decision 
for refugees to return can be altered by the conditions in the country of asylum. If the 
conditions in the country of origin provide less political signals of stability to 
refugees than in the country of asylum, refugees may elect not to return because they 
will always prefer to have guarantees. In a simple game, I assume that refugees assign 
their preferences a value of (1) and not getting their preferences as a value of (-1).  
 











Refugee Payoffs Return: -1 Return: 0 Return: 1 
 
The incentive structure in this scenario is shaped by the dyad relationship. The signal 




of origin. When only the country of asylum signals credible commitments via 
constraints on the executive, the expected payoff is (-1). In this scenario, refugees are 
most likely not to return because the country of origin has not signaled credibility to 
its commitment, and meanwhile the country of asylum is signaling a credible 
commitment. In this dyad relationship, I expect to see most refugees stay in their 
country of asylum or resettle in a third country. 
 
In the second relationship, one of two scenarios occurs. Either both the country of 
asylum and country of origin make credible commitments, or neither country makes a 
credible commitment. For both scenarios, refugee preferences are given a value of 
(0). This results because the credibility of refugees achieving the most resources is 
roughly equal in both countries. Thus, in this dyad relationship, I expect to see 
minimal refugee return. 
 
However, in the third dyad relationship, the expected payoff is (1). This is because 
the credible commitment via constraints on the executive in the country of origin 
signal to refugees that their preferences will be met. At the same time, the country of 
asylum lacks such signals. Thus, when this is the case, I expect that refugees are most 
likely to return home.   
 
My hypotheses are thus updated by introducing the dyad relationship. I expect the 
same constraining political institutions to provide credible commitments to policy 




elections of the executive, more independent legislatures, and power sharing 
arrangements will matter in their relationship between the country of asylum and 
country of origin. When credible commitments exist only in the country of origin, 
refugees will be more likely to return home since this is the most likely way to 
achieve the most guarantees. When such commitments are equal between the two 
countries, refugees will face equal incentive to stay and go because both countries 
signal either policy stability or instability. Finally, when credible commitments exist 
only in the country of asylum, refugees should face an incentive not to return home, 
because staying in the country of asylum presents the best opportunity for guarantees 
of assistance due to the signals of stability.  
 
These expectations lead to a number of observable hypotheses 
2a) When the country of origin has greater direct electoral constraints on the 
executive than the country of asylum, the level of refugee returns will be higher. 
 
2b) When the country of origin has greater legislative independence than the 
country of asylum, the level of refugee returns will be higher. 
 
2c) When the country of origin has greater power-sharing constraints on the 
executive than the country of asylum, the level of refugee returns will be higher. 
 
2.7 Return Hypotheses: By Commitment Type 
I now examine whether the preferences of governments or refugees change in regard 
to specific commitments of the agreement. Lack of attention to details in the 
agreement can cause problems – for example land tenure or property concerns (Unruh 
and Williams 2013). Thus, a realistic expectation is that specific commitments in the 




constraining political institutions, I expect that specific agreement commitments do 
not drive refugee return. Rather, I expect that refugees seek the signals of government 
institutions, and that governments cannot credibly commit to any specific provision 
without such institutional constraints. Thus, it matters less what the specific provision 
says than whether institutions constrain the executive, producing a credible 
commitment to the provision. I thus examine the efficacy of specific provisions.  
 
The specific commitments in refugee agreements can be wide ranging. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. However, commitments can be placed into 
two main categories: 1) security commitments and 2) socioeconomic commitments. 
Security commitments are those that establish physical security such as clearing of 
landmines, and protection from physical harm. Socioeconomic commitments are 
those that establish access to legal documentation, property, amnesties and political 
rights. It also might be assumed that a larger number of commitments are more 
valuable – many practitioners emphasize the numerous areas that must be addressed.  
 
No matter the specific wording in the agreement, commitments that fall under these 
categories do not provide credible commitments. Instead, the existence of institutions 
that produce constraint on the executive provide such credible commitments. I 
assume that executives assign preferences based on the desire to minimize their costs 
while maintaining political power. Constraining institutions alter these. To illustrate 
this, I again assume that governments assign economic advantages a value of 1 and 





Government Options No constraining 
institutions 
Constraining institutions 
Adhere to Security 
Commitments 
Economically costly  














Adhere to More Total 
Commitments 
Economically costly 





Renege Economical advantage 






Without constraining political institutions, the cost structure plays out similar to our 
previous expectations. No matter the commitment type, each is economically costly. 
Because institutions do not punish reneging, the political cost of reneging is zero. Due 
to this, the government preference is to renege. Reneging provides the best economic 
advantage and has no political cost. Thus, I expect that without constraining political 
institutions, the type of provision or number of provisions will not produce incentive 
for refugees to return since governments cannot credible commit to the provisions 
they made. 
 
The preferences are altered when politically constraining institutions are introduced. 
Producing the provisions might be economically costly, but due to the threat of loss 
of power if the executive reneges, adhering to the provisions provides a political 




commitments, the government will only have incentive to follow through based on 
the institutions that exist, making such commitments credible.  
 
In this example, refugee preferences stay the same – they prefer to go where they will 
have greater guarantees of security, economic and political guarantees. Thus, when 
there are no constraining institutions, refugees will choose to stay in the country of 
asylum regardless of commitment type or amount of commitments. When there are 
constraining institutions in the country of origin, this will signal a credible 
commitment to refugees that whatever provision is proposed is likely to be upheld.  
 
I also expect this relationship to hold when considering return between dyads. Even if 
the country of origin has numerous and important commitments to refugees 
guaranteeing assistance with returns, refugees will not seek return unless the 
government in the country of origin can credibly commit as compared to the country 
of asylum. I thus plan to test this third set of hypotheses in both country level and 
dyad level models. A number of observable hypotheses generate from these 
preferences. 
 
3a) Regardless of commitment type, countries with direct constraints on the 
executive will have greater level of refugee return as compared to countries 
without direct constraints on the executive. 
 
3b) Regardless of commitment type, countries with more independent 






3c) Regardless of commitment type, countries with power-sharing arrangements 
will have a greater level of return as compared to countries without power-
sharing arrangements. 
 
2.8 Research Design 
Much of the existing research has focused on the outward flow of refugees. Here, I 
focus on determinants of return. Previous studies have relied on case studies – yet 
none have systematically examined return on the large-N level. To test these 
hypotheses I propose a large-N research design using returnees as the dependent 
variable and operationalization of these concepts as the explanatory variables. In 
addition, I propose controlling for the findings in the literature that are most 
associated with forced refugee flow: violence and economic opportunity.  
 
Preceding the statistical analysis is a discussion of three illustrative cases. These show 
the workings of the theory and trace the process of my mechanisms to support the 
large-N data. In addition, these cases allow me to show graphical and descriptive data 





Chapter 3: Displacement and Re-placement: Illustrative cases 
and Patterns of Return  
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide descriptive evidence to support the theoretical 
expectations described in the previous chapter. Here I present the general trends in 
refugee return as well as three brief cases to illustrate the intuitions behind my theory. 
In Chapter 4, I turn to statistical analysis, where the statistical models that include 
data from these cases – and others –will provide support for these trends.  
 
I begin by showing the variation in refugee return after conflicts, and then turn to case 
studies that differ on my main theoretical mechanism: the institutions. In Sierra 
Leone, return policy was nearly fully implemented by the creation of specific action 
plans and government committees to address returns, and the percentage of returns 
were high. However, in Djibouti, the government took no action to address returnees, 
and returns remained near zero. In Liberia, returns increased and peaked with the 
introduction of democratic institutions that constrained the executive. Through these 
examples, I weave together a narrative that shows how political institutions credibly 
commit governments to implement provisions of their refugee agreements and how 




3.2 Conflicts, Refugees, Returnees, Institutions, and Agreements  
Since 1989, there have been 188 partial, full, dyadic and comprehensive peace 
agreements. Of these, 58 have made some provisions for refugee return. I select this 
time period because the focus on return has grown since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union – and the data on returns has become more available since this time. However, 
for my analytics, I focus on 24 post-conflict agreements in 23 countries since this 
time. These are the agreements that are full and comprehensive peace agreements – 
meaning they were the final agreement in the process and they were between all 
fighting groups party to the conflict. I use evidence from these cases to show 
examples of my expectations in this chapter. 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees tracks the total number of 
refugees originating from each country each year. This number is not a measure of 
flow of refugees each year, but rather it is a measure of the total number of refugees 
that have gathered over time from the country. The same family might be counted in 
more than one year whether or not they were forced to flee their country in that year. 
Nonetheless, the total number of refugees originating from a country each year is 
valuable for purposes of this project because the level of returns in a given year is 
directly dependent on the number of refugees that exist. Thus, the first order of 
business is to track how many refugees originate from the countries in each post-
conflict period. Figure 3.1 below shows the total number of refugees across the 24 




expected. As countries transition from conflict, those that claimed refuge should 





As shown in Figure 3.1 – the level of refugees can remain high even 10 years after the 
peace agreement providing for their return. In some cases, refugees originating from 
the country continue to grow even in the post-conflict period. However, we do see a 
general trend towards low levels of refugees as time goes on. 
 
The UNHCR also provides data for returns during these 24 post-conflict periods. 
Figure 3.2 below shows the variation in returns over post-conflict periods. Over time 
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there are fewer people to return home. Alternatively, some people may simply choose 






As shown here, the level of returns can vary quite a bit. While many cases see returns 
that are low in number, some cases see a spike of returns – and it is not always 
constant. Also of note is that spikes in level of returns can occur even between 5 and 
10 years after the peace agreement. Thus, refugee returns vary even among cases with 
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Figure 3.2 is helpful in showing variation, yet it can also be helpful to show returns as 
a proportion of the level of refugees. Figure 3.3 shows how many returned each year 
in the post-conflict episode by taking into account how many refugees existed each 
year from that particular conflict. The variation in level of return is quite high. This 
variation is what this project seeks to explain. Note that there are a small number of 
cases where the level of return exceeds the level of refugees for that year. I drop these 
outlying cases in Figure 3 because their inclusion takes away from the visualization 
of the other cases. For reasons why outliers exist and for a depiction of the graph with 




Note that there is seemingly no pattern to this variation. Jumps in levels of return as a 
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appear to occur within 10 years of the signing of the agreement. This variation is what 
I seek to explain. When do refugees return home? My argument is that they will 
return when they receive credible commitments to the refugee provisions. When there 
are not commitments to these provisions, they will not return. 
3.3 Illustrative Cases 
While the figures in the previous sections are messy, some clarity comes when 
breaking these data down by country. Examining cases will allow me to trace out 
mechanisms that are at play and produce depictions that are most explanatory. I 
proceed by selecting cases that differ on the explanatory variable: institutions. I first 
choose a case where institutions exist that constrain the executive, and examine how 
return works in that case. Then I select a case where the institutions do not 
meaningfully constrain the executive. I will finish with a case that examines within 
case variation: a shift from non-constraining institutions to constraining institutions.  
3.4 Sierra Leone – Refugees With Executive Constraints 
3.4.1 Conflict Background 
In 1991, civil war broke out in Sierra Leone. The cause of the war is difficult to 
pinpoint – but observers suggest it was caused by a decline in state power, a shift in 
international focus after the Cold War, and most importantly: diamonds. Notably, 
ethnic and religious rivalries were not a cause of this conflict (Dupuy and Binningsbø 





In 1991, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – led by Charles Taylor – 
crossed into Sierra Leone and engaged with Sierra Leone’s army. Eventually the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) – led by former Sierra Leonean army corporal 
Foday Sankoh – aligned with the NPFL and engaged in civil conflict with the 
government of Sierra Leone (Fyfe 2015). In this way, the Sierra Leonean civil war is 
sometimes thought to be a spillover of the Liberian conflict. Indeed, Charles Taylor 
of Liberia and Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone were connected through time spent 
training for insurgency in Libya (Harris 2014, 83). However, the conflict in Sierra 
Leone was more complicated than merely a spillover from Liberia. 
 
One of the main factors in the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone was the slow 
decline of state power since independence in 1961, and some of the fighting was done 
over grievances with the collapse of the patrimonial state (Dupuy and Binningsbø 
2007). The end of the Cold War meant that the ideologically motivated aid that had 
earlier flowed into Sierra Leone stopped flowing into the country and the already 
weak post-colonial government lost revenue (Harris 2014). The loss of such revenue 
contributed to further collapse of state power. 
 
One of the most cited factors in the Sierra Leone civil war is greed. Sierra Leone is a 
major producer of diamonds, and the revenues from these diamonds often fueled and 
drove Sierra Leonean rebels. Rather than ideological rebels, many fighters were 




Indeed, the Sierra Leonean ambassador to the UN claimed as much when he stated 
that the conflict: 
…is not about ideology, tribal or regional differences. It has nothing to 
do with the so-called problem of marginalized youths, or, as some 
political commentators have characterized it, an uprising by rural poor 
against the urban elite. The root of the conflict is, and remains, 
diamonds, diamonds and diamonds. (Harris 2014, 90) 
 
The international community continued to buy such “blood diamonds” even as 
conflict wore on (Harris 2014, 85). Harris (2014) notes that that many called the RUF 
not ‘rebels,’ but ‘bandits’, in another nod to how little ethnic and religious ties had to 
do with this conflict (89).  
 
A lull in the conflict occurred with a peace agreement in 1996, and elections were 
held. The RUF sought to discourage voting by engaging in pre-election violence, 
including the amputating of hands. In light of this, voter turnout was under 50% 
(Harris 2014, 102). However, this fragile peace failed and the government was 
overthrown in a coup in 1997 (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007). A major rebel offensive 
went north in October of 1997, but West African ECOMOG troops drove back, 
ousting the coup plotters and restoring the elected government in 1998 (Dupuy and 
Binningsbø 2007, iii). However, on January 6 of 1999 there was a major rebel attack 
on Freetown and the war raged on (Harris 2014, 110-111). 
 
After pushback by internationally backed forces, the Lomé Accord was signed in July 
1999. This is the accord that would eventually cement the peace deal that includes 




began fighting over inclusion in the power-sharing plan (Fyfe 2015). The Lomé Peace 
Agreement fell apart as the government failed to allocate the seats to the RUF that 
were promised in the agreement, and Sankoh continued fighting; the RUF kidnapped 
500 UN peacekeepers in 2000 (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007). However, Sankoh and 
other RUF members were arrested as a result (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007). 
Weakened by military defeats, the RUF rejoined peace negotiations. In November of 
2000 the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed as a supplement to the Lomé Peace 
Agreement, and it reaffirmed the commitments of the 1999 Lomé Agreement (UCDP 
database). This supplement to the Lomé agreement in 2000 included provisions for 
refugee return. By January 2002, 72,000 combatants had been registered for DDR 
(Harris 2014, 116). The official end of the conflict for the UCDP conflict termination 
dataset is 2000, although the official ceremony declaring peace occurred in January of 
2002. 
3.4.2 Displacement 
Displacement was a major part of the Sierra Leonean conflict. It is estimated that 
throughout the conflict approximately 2,000,000 were displaced (Fyfe 2015). 
According to UNHCR refugee data (2015), the amount of refugees originating from 
Sierra Leone reached a peak of 490,000 in 1999. An estimated 300,000 were in 
Guinea, 70,000 in Liberia, 10,000 in Gambia, 4,000 in Nigeria, 2,000 in Ghana, 2,000 
in Côte d’Ivoire, and 1,000 in Mali (USCR 2001). Thus, the bulk of refugees sought 





The war in Sierra Leone took place mainly in the diamond-producing region, causing 
displacement of those who lived in that region (USCR 2001). During the conflict the 
RUF and AFRC controlled the eastern diamond-mining regions and northern rural 
areas of the country (USCR 2001). However, during the 1999 offensive into 
Freetown, the rebels captured about two thirds of the city and caused massive 
displacement of that urban area (USCR 2001).  
 
Because of the geographical and economically induced origins of the conflict, 
refugees originating from Sierra Leone did not necessarily originate from one specific 
ethnic or religious group. Sierra Leone has about 18 ethnic groups. The two main 
groups are the Mende and the Temne. The Mende are found mostly in the east and 
south, while the Temne are found mostly in the center and northwest of the country 
(Fyfe 2015). Because of this, fighting that occurred in the east and north resulted in 
the displacement of both main ethnic groups. The RUF itself was a multi-ethnic rebel 
group (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007). The RUF was dominated by mostly 
unemployed and uneducated youths (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007).  
 
The main divisions in the country are by administrative region: Western, Northern, 
Eastern and Southern regions. The All People’s Congress (APC) mostly represents 
the Temne-dominated central and northern region of the country, while the Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP) represents the mostly Mende southern and eastern parts 




3.4.3 Refugee Agreement Provisions 
The Lomé Peace Agreement that was signed in 1999 is the comprehensive agreement 
that is the backbone for the post-conflict period in Sierra Leone. While some fighting 
continued, this is the basis for the peace that occurred when the RUF became 
signatories to the agreement. The Lomé Agreement contained two main articles 
addressing the refugees. 
Article XXII: Refugees and Displaced Persons 
The Parties through the National Commission for Resettlement, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction agree to seek funding from and the 
involvement of the UN and other agencies, including friendly 
countries, in order to design and implement a plan for voluntary 
repatriation and reintegration of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally 
displaced persons, including non-combatants, in conformity with 
international conventions, norms and practices. 
 
Article XXIII: Guarantee of the Security of Displaced Persons and 
Refugees 
As a reaffirmation of their commitment to the observation of the 
conventions and principles of human rights and the status of refugees, 
the Parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to ensure that 
the right of Sierra Leoneans to asylum is fully respected and that no 
camps or dwellings of refugees or displaced persons are violated. 
 
These provisions provide a number of guarantees: funding will be sought from the 
UN and other agencies to “implement a plan” for return. While vague – this does 
cement in the agreement the idea of the resources that must be distributed towards 
refugees in order for return to occur. As will be examined in the section below, this 
provision was carried out for the most part: UN and other agencies repatriated and 
funded returnees. 
 
The second article guarantees safety of Sierra Leoneans in camps. This article 




they transition. Again, as will be discussed, the actions of the government 
demonstrated some commitment to this provision: the government sought to protect 
Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea that were threatened. Other articles in the 
agreement called for power sharing and disarmament. These also contributed to the 
safety of environment for returnees. 
3.4.4 Returns to Sierra Leone 
Returns reached nearly 270,000 10 years after the agreement (UNHCR data). In the 
months following the peace agreement in 1999, some returns occurred under unsecure 
conditions. Some of this return was due to conflict in surrounding areas. In May 2000 
the last efforts of RUF rebels created conflict in Guinea, and tens of thousands 
returned to Sierra Leone. Unable to return to their homes, these returnees added to the 
level of internally displaced in Sierra Leone (USCR 2001).  However, returns were in 
full swing by the beginning of 2002. In March 2002 the UN began twice-weekly 
convoys to return refugees home from Guinea, for which the demand was high. At 
that time, 15,000 refugees in Guinea had applied for repatriation to Sierra Leone. And 
8,900 had returned from Liberia (UNHCR 2002).  
 
To examine returns in more detail, I created a graphical representation of returnees. 
Each country is represented by a vertex, the size of which is related to the level of 
refugees originating from Sierra Leone. The size of the edge between the country and 
Sierra Leone is representative of how many returns occurred in 2002. As can be seen, 
the majority of returns were from the neighboring countries of Liberia and Guinea, 




countries also saw returns, including Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Libya, Senegal, Morocco, 
and Mauritania. Other neighboring countries that held a number of Sierra Leonean 
refugees – such as Gambia, Mali, and Togo – did not see returns during 2002. 
Figure 3.4 
 
Due to the skew in level of refugees, the size of both the vertices and edges between 
them does not show the level of refugees linearly. However, the graph is indicative of 
a strong level of refugee returns from countries holding Sierra Leonean refugees 
during the post-conflict period. This number continued to grow over time. The figure 




5 years in the post-conflict episode as the level of refugees originating from Sierra 





In what follows, I connect this drop to the institutions that are present in Sierra Leone, 
and connect this to the ability of these institutions to commit the government to 
contributing to the needs of returnees.  
3.4.5 Institutional Structure 
Sierra Leone is a former British colony, and structures reflect that influence. The 
government is divided into three branches: legislature, executive and judicial. The 





















appointed cabinet that is approved by the legislature. Both executive and legislative 
representatives serve 5-year terms. There are 124 seats in parliament, with 112 
members elected by popular vote and 12 filled by chiefs that are elected in a separate 
election (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007).   
 
The post-conflict elections were held in May 2002. During these elections Kabbah 
won the majority of the vote. Kabbah’s administration focused on “fostering 
reconciliation, maintaining internal security, and promoting economic recovery and 
reform” (Fyfe 2015). And further, the 2007 elections brought opposition leader Ernest 
Bai Koroma to power, further cementing the democratic nature of the institutions in 
Sierra Leone (Fyfe 2015).  
 
In the post-conflict period, Sierra Leone had a president that faced meaningful 
opposition in the competition for office. Kabbah won about 70% of the vote, while 
the opposition candidates got 22% and 3%. Additionally, the turnout was not so high 
as to suggest it was highly irregular: it was 82%. Comparatively to prior elections, the 
level of election violence was low  (Harris 2014, 120-122). And finally, in 2007, the 
executive party changed. This is significant in that the ultimate test of democracy is 
whether the party that loses an election indeed gives up power (Cheibub et al 2010). 
In the legislature, out of a total of 69 legislative seats, the government side had 44 






Sierra Leone had political, military, and economic power sharing as part of the 
agreement. The agreement included a grand coalition cabinet, “with four ministerial 
and four deputy ministerial posts to the RUF (of an 18 member cabinet)” (Dupuy and 
Binningsbø 2007, 20). The agreement also gave Sankoh control of the Commission 
for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development (CMRRD), which gave him “de facto control over the diamond rich 
areas in the east and north of the country” (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007). The 
agreement also incorporated rebel elements into the national military. Sankoh was to 
be appointed vice president (Dupuy and Binningsbø 2007).  
 
While the government maintained a strong majority, credible commitments to the 
refugee agreement were formed because of the inclusion of a directly elected 
executive, a fairly sizeable opposition in the legislature and the existence of power 
sharing arrangements. These institutions provided increased cost for reneging on the 
commitments made in the agreement. Below, I tie these constraining government 
structures to the actions that were taken in regards to refugees and their ability to 
return. I trace the effect of these institutions through the actions that were taken and 
the level of return that occurred.  
3.4.6 Government Actions 
In the context of the political institutions outlined above, several government actions 
occurred. The government assisted with returnee political participation in elections, 




capability of the post-conflict government was imperfect, such actions stemmed from 
the existence of institutions that demanded such action. 
 
The government formed the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) in December of 2000 and formed a strategy in October 
2001 to establish a plan for refugee resettlement (Brookings). Also in 2001, to 
coordinate returns, the National Recovery Committee (NRC) was formed, chaired by 
the Vice-President. The NRC coordinated with donor countries, NGOs, the UN, and 
the government of Sierra Leone to deliver resources to returnees (Cook 2003, 42). 
The NRC conducted a nationwide assessment of districts in 2001 and in 2002 had a 
strategy that provided recommendations to the government for where returnees could 
return (Cook 2003, 42). This strategy was the “Recovery Strategy for Newly 
Accessible Areas,” which was published in May of 2002. This strategy emphasized 
resettlement repatriation and reintegration (Brookings). During this period the 
government conducted many projects to improve health, education, and local 
administration abilities (Cook 2003, 42).  
 
Evidence shows that these groups followed through – at least partially – on their 
plans. World Bank documents shows that a November 2001 National Consultative 
Conference was held in which the government cited progress on preconditions for the 
upcoming elections that included repatriation of refugees and voter registration 
(World Bank 2002). This meeting cited partial progress towards this goal, with 60% 




that the government’s plan would focus on shelter for returnees, and strong support 
for agriculture (2002, 18). 
 
Furthermore, the government took actions to address the problems associated with 
returns. Due to the lack of government capacity during initial returns, many returnees 
were forced to stay in temporary settlements (Cook 2003, 41). However, efforts were 
made by the government to address these returnees, especially as the 2002 elections 
drew closer. The government established a policy to allow internally displaced people 
to vote. This was called “transfer voting,” in which people with valid voter ID cards 
and transfer slips could vote at the places where they had transferred even if their 
names were not on the registration lists (Harris 2014, 121). Such actions were an 
attempt to incorporate returnees. 
 
The government also made efforts to secure safety for refugees in their camps and to 
foster an environment for return. As the fighting spilled into Guinea in May of 2000, 
the government sponsored a ferry to transport thousands of Sierra Leoneans from 
Guinea back to Sierra Leone (USCR 2001).  
 
However, the picture of returns is not entirely positive when taken from the view of 
public opinion. Public opinion research suggests that the government follow-through 
on many initiatives was lacking (Sesay et al. 2009). Sesay et al. (2009) conducted 
personal interviews and local surveys to examine the level of satisfaction with 




suggest that the government could have done more with the resources available to it 
through the international community’s donations, but chose not to. One reason for 
this might be corruption (Sesay et al 2009, 74). Yet – while the public may have 
desired more – some action did undeniably occur, and international funds did flow 
into the country with the aim of assisting in these actions. Sesay et al. (2009) note that 
Sierra Leone was viewed favorably abroad, and that the international donor 
community largely donated funds to Sierra Leone due to the perception that Kabbah 
was a democrat and the democratic process was worth ideological support.   
3.4.7 Discussion and Challenges 
While not all refugees returned to Sierra Leone, returns occurred at a higher rate than 
many other post-conflict countries. Sierra Leone is not without challenges in the area 
of returns. The country continues to have refugees that originate from its territory, 
and the information we have about the reintegration of returnees is not complete. 
Thus, the quality of returnee experience may still require attention. However, the 
government consisted of meaningful constraints on the executive, and thus provided a 
credible commitment. This indeed proved credible as the government acted 
inclusively and with concern for the needs of returnees. The NCRRR and NRC were 
created as a way to create the conditions that would contribute to durable return. 
While not all challenges that returnees face were addressed, these government actions 
contributed to the large level of return.  
 
Notably, ethnic tensions were not a part of the conflict in Sierra Leone, which had 




terms of executive constraints were extended: because refugees were not of one 
particular ethnic group, it was perhaps easier for Sierra Leone to extend a credible 
commitment. While I do not test for factors that led to credible commitment, I do 
argue that the credible commitment itself is immensely important to the created 
conditions for refugee return. While this and other factors may have played a role in 
refugee return to Sierra Leone, I argue that the effect of institutions cannot be 
overlooked. The purpose of this illustrative case is to identify the process of how 
political institutions can contribute to return. 
3.5 Djibouti – Refugees without Executive Constraints 
3.5.1 Conflict Background 
Djibouti is a small country on the horn of Africa, with a population of about 730,000. 
The conflict took place between two ethnic groups – Issa and Afar. The Issa have 
maintained power over government, while many Afar are nomadic and are not 
included in government. By the numbers, Djibouti is approximately 60% Somali and 
35% Afar. Of Somalis, about 40% are Issa (Yoh 2003).  
 
The president in the early 1990s was Hassan Gouled Aptidon – a member of the Issa 
ethnic group. President Aptidon ruled since independence in 1977 until 1999 when he 
became ill (Schraeder & Steedle 2008; World Factbook 2013-14). During his rule, he 
mostly supported his own Issa ethnic group and imprisoned or exiled his opponents 





Without allowing Afar tribesmen access to government, and with some economic 
downturn, the Afar turned to war from 1991 to 1993. The Afar insurgency was led by 
the Front pour le Restauration de l’Unité et la Démocratie (FRUD) – which consisted 
of about 3,000 Afar guerilla fighters (Schraeder & Steedle 2008). FRUD launched a 
military offensive to topple the Issa-led regime in 1991. During the conflict, Aptidon 
enacted some reforms to quell the violence. Such measures included writing a new 
constitution and legalizing more political parties. In light of this, elections were held 
in 1992 and 1993. However, due to continued inequalities in participation, FRUD and 
most members of the Afar community boycotted these elections. As a result, Aptidon 
and his party easily won reelection.  
 
After his reelection, Aptidon launched an offensive against FRUD in 1993 (Schraeder 
& Steedle 2008). In 1994, an agreement was signed between moderate members of 
the Afar insurgency; however, the radical wing of the insurgency continued fighting 
and did not sign an agreement until 2001 (IRIN). When president Aptidon became ill 
and Ismaël Omar Guellah came to power in 1999, the leader of the militant faction of 
FRUD – Ahmed Dini – returned and the civil war finally came to an end. A formal 
peace agreement was signed in 2001, officially ending the conflict (Schraeder & 
Steedle 2008). 
3.5.2 Displacement 
The Afar live in the north and west of the Gulf of Tadjoura, which juts into the center 
of the country. The Somali are concentrated in the capital and southeast of the 




Because of this, Djibouti is one of the most urbanized countries in Africa, with four-
fifths of the population in urban centers (Cutbill 2015). Many Afar were displaced 
during the insurgency, which occurred mostly in northern and southwestern Djibouti 
(IRIN). At the end of 1994, over 18,000 people were refugees originating from 
Djibouti – a country of roughly 650,000 people at that time.  
 
Ethiopia was one of the most common destinations for Djiboutian refugees. From 
1991 to 1994 an estimated 9,000 mostly Afar civilians had fled to Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project, 2009). By 1997, the State Department’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996 reported that 10,000-18,000 
displaced Djiboutian Afars were living in Ethiopia (MAR 2009).  
 
President Aptidon claimed that these displaced Afars were free to return – and indeed 
the level of violence in the country was below conflict threshold in 1997 – yet these 
refugees did not return for fear of their safety in these regions (MAR 2009). Rather 
than return, many of these refugees resettled elsewhere as returns from 1994-2000 
were nonexistent, except for 2 people in 2000. However because of settlement 
elsewhere, the official level of refugees originating from Djibouti at the time of the 
agreement in 2001 was 452 (UNHCR data 2015). Data on their resettlement or 
perhaps local integration into Ethiopia is not available. However, the lack of returns 
can be directly tied to the institutional structure. While promises such as the refugee 
agreement and presidential comments suggested return was viable, refugees did not 




3.5.3 Refugee Agreement 
By 1994, the FRUD had splintered and the largest – more moderate – group signed a 
peace agreement largely ending the civil war. However, the final agreement with the 
last faction of FRUD was signed in 2001 (Cutbill 2015). On May 12, 2001, the 
agreement was signed. It included a provision in Article 8 section B regarding 
refugees: 
b) Facing the enormity of the task of national reconciliation, the two 
Parties have agreed to grant this budget item a very special 
significance and to involve all the appropriate measures having in view 
the rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons, the compensation 
of individuals whose belongings have been destroyed during the 
conflict and the reconstruction of public infrastructure. (PAM 2015) 
 
This is notable for a number of reasons: first, it outlines budget appropriations for 
property restitution and access to public resources for refugees. These are two main 
areas of assistance guarantees. However, the agreement does not address other 
refugee issues, and as will be shown, the implementation of its provisions will be 
nearly nonexistent, as government institutions provided no commitment to returnees. 
3.5.4 Returns to Djibouti 
According to UNHCR, the year before the agreement there were 1,910 refugees 
originating from Djibouti. This is not a large number as a proportion of the number of 
refugees worldwide, but it is large considering the population of Djibouti at the time 
of the agreement was 733,732 (World Bank 2015). Djibouti saw about a quarter of 
those refugees return during the year of the agreement – and none in the years 
following. While some returned alongside the original agreement, the government has 
actually blocked and forced out those it considers illegal immigrants in the time since 




UNHCR was set to return some 600 Djiboutians of Afar ethnic origin to Djibouti 
from Ethiopia (UNHCR 2001). The actual number returned would be 452. 
 
The graphical representation below shows returns to Djibouti after the final peace 
agreement. Other than the 452 that return on the year of the peace agreement, 
Djibouti sees no returnees. Further, the level of refugees originating from Djibouti 
actually continues to rise in the years that follow, suggesting that government reneged 
on its promise to foster returns. 
Figure 3.6 
 
As the numbers show, refugees simply did not return to Djibouti in large numbers. In 
















3.5.5 Institutional Structure In Djibouti 
The institutions in Djibouti during this time provided little to no constraints on the 
executive. Thus, the commitments in the refugee agreement were not credible – and 
returns did not occur at a meaningful rate. Historically, Djibouti was a single party 
state. However, a new constitution in 1992 allowed for multiple parties. Some of the 
moderate FRUD leaders who took part in the 1994 peace agreement became ministers 
in the government. Additionally, these members of FRUD were allowed to legally 
register as a political party in 1996. However – even with these reforms – Djibouti 
remained a de facto one-party state during this time. In 2001 – as the final agreement 
was signed – the new president Guelleh named an Afar – Dileita – as prime minister, 
and lifted the previous restriction on number of political parties in 2002. In January 
2003, elections took place. Of the 8 parties that took part, they fell into two major 
blocks. The first was the government backed Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle 
(UMP) and the second was the opposition (Dini formerly of FRUD) backed Union 
pour une Alternance Démocratique (UAD). The government-backed party includes 
the wing of FRUD that aligned with the government in 1994. The opposition-backed 
party was made up of the FRUD wing that continued fighting. The opposition party – 
UAD – lost despite winning 37% of the vote. The incumbent UMP party won all seats 
in the National Assembly. UAD planned protests but they were banned and the 
Constitutional Court rejected their case. In 2004 the opposition leader Dini died. 
Without a clear leader, the opposition boycotted the presidential election of 2005, 
citing “the need for greater transparency and electoral change” (Cutbill 2015). The 




term limits in 2010 and again the opposition boycotted the presidential poll (Cutbill 
2015).  
 
Djibouti has remained an effective one-party state, with no meaningful constraints on 
the executive. Without credible commitments via constraints on the executive, no 
signal was given to refugees that return was viable. And – unfortunately – no 
meaningful return occurred in Djibouti. 
 
3.5.6 Government Actions in Djibouti 
Government actions are difficult to track in Djibouti, as not much attention has been 
placed on this small country. However, the evidence that exists shows a country that 
is attempting to reformulate its citizenship laws, and has not focused squarely on 
fostering return. Evidence suggests the government did not follow through with 
actions to implement the refugee agreement.  
 
According to Bezabeh (2011), the government was found to be involved in expelling 
any non-Issa that entered from Ethiopia – even those that were not refugees (604). 
Indeed, in 2003 the government attempted to expel about 100,000 people by labeling 
them “illegal migrants” (Bezabeh 2011). Such evidence suggests that – rather than 
create the conditions necessary to foster return – the government of Djibouti placed 
its focus elsewhere. After the peace agreement, the early 2000s involved an economic 
investment in the capital city, with little to no resources going to the outer-lying areas 




not implemented and decentralization did not occurred in practice (Abdallah 2007, 
277).  
 
As the result of very slow implementation of the peace agreement, armed clashes 
broke out in 2005, which were quickly stamped out by the government. Also in 2005, 
the destruction of the Arhiba slums – which were predominantly Afar – was met with 
protests by thousands. The destruction was done in the name of an urban renewal 
project. Indeed, as of 2006, the government had not honored the pledges in the peace 
agreement, even while a number of Afar were allowed to participate in government 
(MAR 2009).   
3.5.7 Discussion and Challenges 
Ultimately, this case represents an example of a government without constraining 
structures that reneged on its promise to create conditions for return. There is no 
evidence in this case that any committees or commissions were created to foster 
returns. No evidence points to the government creating funds for returnees to help 
them reintegrate, and in fact evidence points to continued persecution of the Afar 
minority through expulsions of what Djibouti considers non-citizens. 
 
Challenges remain. The use of this illustrative case is to exhibit how lack of 
constraining institutions can allow a government to renege on its promises in the 
agreement. Djibouti thus provides an excellent example of how the lack of 
constraining institutions provides no credible commitment to the provisions in the 




refugee return. These actions suggest that a government’s unconstrained preferences 
are not always in line with refugee return, and the importance of institutions cannot 
be overlooked. 
3.6 Liberia – Within Case Variation 
The Liberian case allows for examination of within-case variation. The political 
institutions immediately following the peace agreement in 2003 were not as 
constraining on the executive as the institutions following the elections of 2006. This 
allows for examination of returns both with and without constraining institutions in a 
post-conflict period where some other country level variables remain constant. 
Although not all factors in the post-conflict transition remained constant – this allows 
for some leverage in examining the effect of institutions via case study.  
3.6.1 Conflict Background 
The Liberian conflict consisted of two closely related civil wars. The First Liberian 
Civil War began December 24, 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) – led by Charles Taylor – attacked Nimba County in Liberia. Taylor had left 
Liberia in 1985, and after a short prison stint in the United States, returned to Africa 
to train for insurgency in Libya with – among others – Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone 
(Alie 2009, 84). This conflict also came at the end of the Cold War, when – similar to 
Sierra Leone – ideological funds dried up and the Liberian state was weak.   
 
The NPFL at this time was made up mostly of mercenaries from Burkina Faso and 
Côte d’Ivoire – but also consisted of young and disaffected Gio and Mano from 




drugged and made to commit horrible crimes. The fighting soon spread to many 
factions. The NPFL split into the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL). And the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) 
split into ULIMO-J – led by Roosevelt Johnson and mainly Krahn – and ULIMO-K – 
led by Alhaji Kromah and mainly Mandingo (Alie 2009, 84).  
 
A peace process in 1997 called for elections. Taylor’s National Patriotic Party won 
with 75% of the vote – and some feared that if he lost he would continue the war 
(Alie 2009, 85). Taylor’s government was not inclusive, and resistance to his rule 
formed. In 1999 a rebel group – Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy 
(LURD) – formed in Sierra Leone and attacked northwestern Liberia (Guannu 2009, 
36). By 2003 the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) formed out of 
LURD and attacked the southeast and central Liberia. This, along with an intense 
attack by LURD on Monrovia, pressured Charles Taylor to resign, and the Accra 
Peace Talks took place after his resignation (Guanni 2009, 36). On August 18, 2003 
the key actors met in Ghana under President John Kufuor (Chairman of ECOWAS) 
and signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Alie 2009, 86). The main result of 
this agreement was Taylor’s resignation and exile (Alie 2009, 86).  
3.6.2 Displacement in Liberia 
Scott (1998) examines the causes of displacement in Liberia. While the conflict is the 
most central reason for refugees, Scott cites a number of additional factors for 
displacement including tensions between coastal elites and indigenous populations 




groups involved, and how control over territory pushed subsequent groups (Nilsson 
2003, 11).  Throughout the mid-1990s, refugees peaked at almost 800,000 according 
to those registered with UNHCR. Due to returns and resettlements between the first 
and second Liberian Civil Wars, that number peaked at 350,000 refugees by the time 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2003 (UNHCR data).  
 
Including internal displacement, nearly all Liberians were forced from their homes at 
some point during the conflict (Shilue and Fagen 2014). Many Liberians fled to 
Guinea, where about 400,000 sought refuge, while another 240,000 sought refuge in 
Côte d’Ivoire (Nilsson 2003, 12). Another estimated 17,000 sought refuge in Sierra 
Leone. These refugee destination were not always secure as active conflicts occurred 
with a military coup in Côte d’Ivoire and with fighting along the borders of Guinea 
and Sierra Leone as Charles Taylor fought with LURD (Nilsson 2003, 7).  
 
During the Liberian conflict, the first to leave were the “Liberian intellectuals, human 
rights defenders, journalists, political opponents, and former government workers” 
since these groups were targeted by all sides in the violence (Dabo 2012). Dabo 
(2012) argues that the subsequent involvement of refugees in the peace process as 
opposed to IDPs is due to their educated nature. 
3.6.3 Refugee Agreement 
The provisions in the refugee agreement are from the Peace Agreement Matrix hosted 
by the University of Notre Dame. The provisions in the agreement include Article 




that provide for security of the humanitarian agencies and physical security 
specifically for returnees guaranteed by an international force. 
ARTICLE XXX: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 
1. (a) The NTGL, with the assistance of the International Community, 
shall design and implement a plan for the voluntary return and 
reintegration of Liberian refugees and internally displaced persons, 
including non-combatants, in accordance with international 
conventions, norms and practices. 
(b) Refugees or internally displaced persons, desirous of returning to 
their original Counties or permanent residences, shall be assisted to do 
so. 
(c) The Parties commit themselves to peaceful co-existence amongst 
returnees and non-returnees in all Counties. 
ARTICLE XIV: HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
1. (a) The Parties re-affirm the commitment made in the Ceasefire 
Agreement, to provide security guarantees for safe and unhindered 
access by all humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups throughout 
the country, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in accordance with international conventions, principles and 
norms governing humanitarian operations. 
(b) Accordingly, the Parties agree to guarantee the security and 
movement of humanitarian personnel, that of their properties, goods 
transported, stocked or distributed, as well as their projects and 
beneficiaries. 
2. The Transitional Government provided for in this agreement shall 
ensure the establishment of effective administrative and security 
infrastructure to monitor and support the implementation of these 
guarantees contained in sub-paragraph 1b of the present Article XIV. 
3. The said Transitional Government shall request the International 
Community to assist in providing humanitarian assistance for those in 
need, including internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees. 
4. The Parties shall ensure the presence of security guarantees for the 
safe return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced 
persons and the free movement of persons and goods. 
ARTICLE IV: INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION FORCE 
3. The Parties request the ISF to assume the following mandate: 
(e) Assist in the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance 
to displaced persons, refugees, returnees and other war-affected 
persons; 
(f) Facilitate the provision and maintenance of humanitarian assistance 
and protect displaced persons, refugees, returnees and other affected 
persons; 
ARTICLE XXIV THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL 




3. The NTLA shall have a maximum of Seventy-six (76) members 
who shall come from the following entities: 
(b) The present Government of Liberia, the LURD, MODEL, the 
Political Parties, Civil Society and Interest Groups including the 
National Bar Association, the Liberian Business Organizations, 
Women Organizations, Trade Unions, Teachers Union, Refugees, the 
Liberians in the Diaspora/America and the Youth. 
(PAM 2015) 
 
The provisions in this agreement are more detailed than the previous examples, yet 
the important factor in the peak of refugee return, as will be shown, is the change in 
institutional structure in the years following the conflict. It is the political 
implementation of these that is of importance. 
 
Provisions in this agreement fall under a number of distinct categories. First, physical 
security is guaranteed to returnees. Article XXX commits the parties to peaceful 
coexistence of returnees and non-returnees, Article XIV commits physical security 
for humanitarian groups, and Article IV requests the International Stabilization force 
to provide security specifically for returning refugees.  
3.6.4 Returns in Liberia 
From 1997 to 2000 an estimated 377,000 people returned to Liberia with some 
assistance from UNHCR (Nilsson 2003, 20). However, due to continued fighting new 
groups of people were displaced and many of those who returned became internally 
displaced (Nilsson 2003, 20). With the peace agreement in 2003, returns began anew. 
The level of return spiked with the election of the new government in 2006. Overall 
displacement has greatly diminished in Liberia, and by the end of 2012 international 
organization assistance wrapped up. The graphical representation below shows the 






We can further examine from where returns occurred using the first year after the 
agreement: 2004. Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone contained the largest levels 
of Liberian refugees and so it is no surprise that the largest volume of returns 
occurred from these countries, especially as they are closest. Returns also occurred in 
2004 from Libya, Nigeria and Ghana. In the illustration that follows, the size of the 
circle represents the level of refugees originating from Liberia residing in the country. 
The thickness of the line connecting the vertices represents the level of returning 



























By 2006 – the year of the election and introduction of institutions constraining the 
executive – we see an increase in overall level and from the number of countries in 
returning refugees. While returns still remain strong form Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Guinea, returns now also come from Mali, Togo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Central 
African Republic, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Cameroon, Gambia and 
Ghana. Again, the refugees are represented by the size of the vertex, and the amount 








In the following section I tie this increase in the level of returns to the political 
institutions that were in flux during this period.  
3.6.5 Institutional Structures in Liberia 
From 2003-2005 an interim government took power, as stipulated by the agreement. 
The legislature and executive were not directly elected, and Liberia was not an 
official democracy at this time, although planning the upcoming elections was one of 




elections – and the inauguration of the elected government in 2006 – that Liberia 
officially became democratic and the institutional structures that put constraints on 
the executive were established.    
 
By examining this change in constraint on the executive, I hope to gain some leverage 
over whether institutional structures encourage refugee return. While the interim 
government was certainly aimed at creating democratic institutions, and had its own 
share of constraints to face in terms of limited capacity and competing political 
interests, the constraining structure on the executive was not quite the same as that 
after the 2005 elections.  
 
The interim government consisted of an executive branch – headed by Gyude Bryant, 
and an interim parliament – the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (Cook 
2005). The interim government faced challenges in the form of discord over state 
positions and allocation of resources among the warring factions that took part in the 
interim government and limited state capacities and corruption (Cook 2005). During 
this time Liberia was not considered a democracy, as these leaders were not 
democratically elected. However, at this time power-sharing constraints were put into 
place as the warring factions were to take part in the interim government. This created 
some friction as Chairman Bryant initially rejected three of the LURD candidates for 
the cabinet in 2003 (PAM 2015) – however subsequent nominees were accepted. 
Further, as Chairman Bryant sought to fill assistant ministerial positions – a process 




called for his resignation due to the distribution of representation – however this too 
eventually passed (PAM 2015). The transitional government was established on 
January 7, 2004. Constraining institutions on the executive in the form of direct 
executive elections, elected legislature with opposition vote share came into effect 
after the 2005 elections. This also coincides with the highest level of refugee returns.  
3.6.6 Government Actions in Liberia 
The actions of the government toward refugees can be viewed through the lens of the 
political institutions. First, I examine the actions of the interim government. The 
interim government implemented projects ranging from nutrition, water, and 
sanitation to health and transportation infrastructure (Cook 2003). The Liberia 
Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) had been created 
before the end of the conflict, and was responsible for “constructing and 
implementing” programs for the displaced. However, during the initial post-conflict 
period it was yet to begin its work and return assistance occurred mostly through the 
auspices of the UNHCR (Nilsson 2003, 20). The LRRRC had been created by the 
then Interim Legislative Assembly in 1993. It was established to “formulate policies 
and implement programmes of the Government of Liberia and the International High 
Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) in the process of providing… repatriation, 
resettlement and reintegration of Liberian returnees…” (LRRRC). The LRRRC is an 






In early 2004, LRRRC and UNHCR were encouraging refugees not to return, since 
the official program to assist with returns had not yet begun. Refugees that sought 
return on their own at this time faced being charged large sums and were subject to 
internal displacement upon return since the programs for assistance were not yet in 
place (IRIN 2004). However, by late 2004, LRRRC began to assist with returns. 
From 2004 to 2012, the LRRRC along with UNHCR facilitated 155,560 Liberian 
returnees. Thus, the interim government did begin to implement some aspects of the 
agreement. However, in 2005 the interim government shifted focus from addressing 
specific needs of returnees and instead focused on broader programs to address 
broader needs through the Agenda for Transformation and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (Shilue and Fagen 2014, 1). These programs focused on security, economic 
issues, governance issues, and infrastructure and basic service delivery (Shilue and 
Fagen 2014). 
 
After the elections of 2005, a new democratically elected post-conflict government 
came into power in January of 2006, led by president Johnson-Sirleaf. Observers 
noted Johnson-Sirleaf’s constraints as she sought not to alienate members of the elite 
while seeking to win over the confidence of key opposition figures to “avoid 
contentious political deadlocks” (Sesay et al 2009, 49). Further, the government had 
to deal with different parties controlling leadership positions in the legislature (Sesay 
et al 2009, 49). Evidence of the nature of constraint on the executive is in the creation 
of the Forum for Political Party Leaders (FOPPAL) reached in June 2007. This group 




consensus building on key national issues…” (Sesay et al 2009, 50). Such actions are 
indicative of the constraints that executives face under the political institutions in the 
country, and connect to the creation of the conditions that foster return.  
 
With the coming to power of the democratically elected government in January 2006, 
that year Liberia saw its highest level of returns. Returns in this year topped over 
100,000 (UNHCR). By this time the LRRRC was working in hand with UNHCR. The 
UNHCR completed the final repatriations in 2013 – refugees over 18 were given 
US$375 and under 18 were given US$275 by UNHCR to help with transportation and 
reintegration costs. The LRRRC referred returnees to job opportunities, scholarships, 
and assisted with acquiring land to build (UNHCR 2013).   
3.6.7 Discussion and Challenges 
The returns to Liberia occurred in large number, particularly as the democratic 
institutions took hold, and the signal of credible commitment to the refugee 
agreement was made. The government of Liberia faced constraints from opposition 
parties and took serious steps to address returnee conditions. In Liberia, evidence 
shows that returns occurred after these steps and the democratic institutions took 
shape. Whether ethnic dimensions led to the creation of credible commitments is 
unexplored here. However, the creation of credible commitments appears to be 
associated with an increase in the level of returns. This helps to illustrate the use of 





Chapter 4: Explaining the Politics of Return: Empirical Models 
4.1 Introduction 
I now turn to the empirical models that examine my theoretical expectations. This 
chapter first discusses the collection of data, issues related to the data, and the 
appropriate models used for evaluating my hypotheses. I then turn to statistical 
analysis of my data and a discussion of the results. The chapter evaluates my 
hypotheses using two main sets of models. The first set consists of count models 
using country-year as the unit of analysis. The second set consists of count models 
using the dyad-year as the unit of analysis. Both sets of models use returnees as the 
main dependent variable. The first measures overall levels of return to the post-
conflict country, while the second measures levels of return in regard to conditions in 
both the post-conflict country and the country of asylum. 
 
While many post-conflict peace agreements contain provisions for the return of 
refugees, many countries still do not experience return over the post-conflict period. 
This sets the puzzle for my study. I expect that increased constraints on the executive 
will lead to higher levels of return in the post-conflict period because of their ability 
to create credible commitments. Constrained executives can face backlash for 
reneging on their promises. Therefore, I expect that direct executive elections, more 
powerful legislatures, and power-sharing arrangements will lead to a higher rate of 




to follow through on the refugee agreement. These institutions provide a credible 
commitment to refugees, and signal that return is welcome.  
4.2 The Data 
The country-year dataset I compiled relates to my first set of hypotheses. I use it to 
evaluate the conditions in the post-conflict country and the total level of returns that 
the post-conflict country experiences. Among post-conflict returnee agreement 
countries, I expect that countries that have greater constraints on the executive will 
see higher rates of return than countries that do not have such constraints on the 
executive. Below I discuss operationalization of this data.  
4.2.1 Scope 
Since I am interested in the level of returns in post-conflict periods, I identified 
countries emerging from civil conflict using the Uppsala Conflict Data Project’s 
(UCDP) dataset on Conflict Termination (Kreutz 2010). This dataset considers a 
country to be in conflict if more than 25 battle related deaths occur, and cites 
termination after this ceases. This data covers up until 2009. Because I am interested 
in the post-conflict country as a whole, I consider cases where a country 
simultaneously experienced multiple civil conflicts to be a single conflict episode. I 
measure from the start date of the first conflict, to the last date of the final conflict. 
This method is standard in studies where the post-conflict episode is of interest 
(Flores & Noorudin 2012). 
 
The fact that displacement can remain an issue even when countries have peace 




identified countries that had peace agreements that included provisions for refugees 
using the UCDP data on peace agreements (Högbladh 2011). This dataset codes for 
Return and provides a link to the text of the peace agreement that contains such 
provisions. I also cross-referenced these cases with the Peace Agreement Matrix 
project run by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of 
Notre Dame. This project has also identified which agreements contain provisions for 
refugees, and it provides the text for the provisions that do so. It also provides 
information on the implementation of these provisions.  
 
The resulting list of cases combines data from these two sources, with a few 
exceptions. I am only interested in comprehensive agreements. Thus, if the agreement 
was merely dyadic – not occurring between all warring parties – it was dropped. This 
was the case for Serbia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. Further, if the 
agreement focused merely on the internally displaced, it was not included because 
internally displaced mechanisms are outside the scope of this project. This was the 
case for Uganda and Nepal.  
 
This provided me with 24 post-conflict periods with return agreements since 1989, 
which is the basis for my study. These include countries in Africa, Europe, South 
America and Asia. One country, Djibouti, appears twice due to two separate post-
conflict periods that ended with two separate refugee agreements. The UCDP data on 
post-conflict periods carries through the end of 2009, so the base dataset covers 20 





Country Date of Agreement Name of Agreement 
Guatemala 12/29/96 The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace 
El Salvador 1/16/92 The Chapultepec Peace Agreement 
Macedonia 8/13/01 The Ohrid Agreement 
Croatia 11/12/95 The Erdut Agreement 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 12/14/95 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) 
Georgia 4/4/94 Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict 
Guinea-Bissau 11/1/98 Abuja Peace Agreement 
Mali 4/11/92 National Pact 
Senegal 12/30/04 
Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du 
Senegal el le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace 
(MFDC) 
Niger 4/15/95 Accord e´tablissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la republique du Niger et lórganisation de la résistance armée 
Cote D’Ivoire 3/4/07 Ouagadougou Political Agreement 
Liberia 8/18/03 Accra Peace Agreement 
Sierra Leone 11/10/00 Lomé Peace Agreement (Date for Abuja Ceasefire - Supplement to Lome) 
Congo 12/29/99 Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 3/23/09 
Peace Agreement Between The Government And The Congress 
National Pour La Defense Du Peuple (CNDP) 
Burundi 8/28/00 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 
Rwanda 1/9/93 Arusha Accord (Protocol Agreement 9 Jan 1993) 
Djibouti 12/26/94 Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale 
Djibouti 5/12/01 Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord 
Mozambique 3/12/92 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique 
Lebanon 10/22/89 Taif Accord 
Tajikistan 2/21/97 The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan 
Bangladesh 12/2/97 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 
Cambodia 10/23/91 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement" 
 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable 
Returned refugees are difficult to measure. Many people who cross international 
borders are not counted or registered. Further, returns often happen spontaneously 




(UNHCR) provides data measuring the stock of refugees originating from each 
country by year. The UNHCR relies on governmental agencies, UNHCR field offices, 
and NGOs to obtain this data. The data are collected using registers, surveys, 
registration process or censuses. The collection method varies by country (UNHCR). 
This presents a number of challenges: many of those that qualify do not or cannot 
register. Refugees living outside camps are much more difficult to measure, yet the 
UN provides an estimate of such populations where applicable (UNHCR). This is by 
no means ideal, yet it is the best data available on the amount of refugees. Other 
academic research has relied on this data, including Moore and Shellman (2004; 
2006; 2007) among others. For a further discussion of the difficulties regarding 
refugee data, see Crisp (1999). 
 
As early as 1993, the UNHCR also started keeping data on returning refugees. Return 
data is likewise difficult to measure. Often returns are spontaneous and tracking is 
difficult. However, the UNHCR measures the flow of returnees for each year since 
1993. Starting in 2000, UNHCR kept track of returnees by dyad, which I will 
examine in the second half of this chapter. The measure of country-level return is the 
main dependent variable for my model. This number is simply the number of returned 
refugees that returned to the post-conflict country in a given year. Thus, this dataset is 
formatted by country-year. I connected this data in time-series format from 1990-
2009 to cover the 24 post-conflict periods with returnee agreements. The level of 







From this figure it is evident that many countries experience very low levels of return. 
However, others experience returns on a large scale. Return can also spike early or 
later in the years after the agreement. From this it is evident that a great deal of 
variation exists in returns after an agreement that calls for return. 
4.2.3 Explanatory Variables 
The first explanatory variables are the direct constraints on executive action. I expect 
that meaningful elections will provide this type of constraint. I use two sources for 
information on meaningful elections. First, the Democracy and Dictatorship 
Revisisted data by Cheibub et al. (2010) is used; and second, I use the Database of 
Political Institutions by Keefer (2012). The Cheibub et al. data is available for 
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datasets I use information on the direct election of executives through the variable 
democracy and the competitiveness of those elections through the variable eiec 
respectively. The Cheibub et al. (2010) variable for direct democracy is a dummy 
variable measuring 0 if not a democracy and 1 if a democracy. The key distinction in 
this dataset is that a country is considered a democracy if the ruling party has left 
office after losing election. Thus, this variable measures the meaningful constraint 
that elections have on executives not just in that they are elected democratically, but 
also in that they respect the democratic process when elections are lost. The Keefer 
(2012) variable for executive election competitiveness is an ordered variable ranging 
1-7 from not elected, to elected with a lower portion of vote percentage, signifying 
meaningful opposition within the election. One (1) indicates no chief executive, such 
as when there are rivaling chief executives in a country. Two (2) indicates an 
unelected executive. Three (3) indicates an elected executive, but without opposition. 
Four (4) indicates multiple candidates but only 1 party. Five (5) indicates multiple 
parties are legal but only 1 won seats. Six (6) indicates multiple parties won seats but 
largest won more than 75% of the vote. And seven (7) indicates that the executive 
party received less than 75% of the vote. This thus measures the level to which the 
executive is constrained.  
 
The second set of explanatory variables consists of the legislative constraints on 
executive action. I expect that more independent legislatures will provide this type of 
constraint. If a legislature has multiple parties, if they have increased competitive 




further able to constrain the executive. The same two datasets – Cheibub et al. (2010) 
and Keefer (2012) – provide information on the legislature. The first variable I use – 
lparty – is a measure of whether no parties, one party, or multiple parties exist in the 
legislature. The second and third variables are from the Keefer (2012) data. The first 
measures the level of competition in the legislature on an ordinal scale from 1-7 
starting with nonelected legislatures and going up to legislatures with vote shares 
more spread out. This scale is identical to the executive competition scale described 
above. Finally, I use a measure of the percentage of opposition vote to get at the level 
of how constraining the legislature can be. 
 
The third set of explanatory variables in my hypotheses consists of power-sharing 
constraints on executive action. I expect that countries with power sharing as part of 
the agreement will provide this type of constraint through the injection of opposition 
into positions of power. For this measure, I use the Power Sharing Event Database 
(PSED) to measure specific areas of power-sharing that result from agreements 
(Ottmann & Vüllers 2014). The PSED database measures whether a political, 
economic, military or territorial power sharing agreement was reached. I combine 
these into one measure of power sharing. 
4.2.4 Controls 
Control variables are used to address alternative explanations for return. The leading 
theories are that violence causes displacement and that economic opportunity can 
influence where refugees go (see Ch 2 for discussion). Thus, we can expect that an 




include these two variables of interest as controls. First, I use the years in conflict 
from the UCDP termination data to create a dummy variable for years in conflict in 
my dataset. It should be noted that in some post-conflict refugee agreement periods 
there are instances of violence above the 25 battle-death threshold, including some 
cases where the level of violence does not immediately fall down after the peace 
agreement. Thus, this is an important control to include in that violence may affect 
returns at these periods of time. 
 
The second control that I use is data on each country’s Gross Domestic Product per 
capita. This information I attained from the World Bank. This data was connected in 
longitudinal format. Finally, I also connected population data on each country to the 
dataset because the population is important for exposure in count models. 
 
This provides me with the set of variables that I will use in these models. The table 
below presents the summary of variables in dataset. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Returnees 400 22035.48 109358.00 0.00 1410782.00 
Refugees 470 121409.40 243717.00 1.00 2257573.00 
Democracy 432 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Executive Electoral 
Competitiveness 458 5.42 2.05 1.00 7.00 
Parties in Legislature 432 1.61 0.72 0.00 2.00 
Legislative Electoral 
Competitiveness 458 5.83 1.92 1.00 7.00 
Opposition Vote Share 483 14.98 19.79 0.00 75.10 
Power Sharing 483 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Conflict 460 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 





4.3 The Model 
I analyze the amount of returning refugees over 24 post-conflict periods. The most 
basic count model uses the Poisson distribution. This distribution, however, assumes 
that each unit counted is independent of all others. Since we are measuring returnees, 
I do not make the assumption that their actions are independent. Returnees may often 
return as a group or because others have already returned. Therefore, following 
Moore and Shellman (2007) I use a negative binomial distribution. This distribution 
allows for relaxing the assumption of independence of counts. Furthermore, the 
Poisson model assumes that the “variance of the number of occurrences equals the 
expected number of occurrences” (Kennedy 2008, 246). Notice in the summary of 
data that the variance of Returnees is larger than the mean. Since the Poisson model 
ignores this, it produces underestimated standard errors, and often produces many 
significant explanatory variables (Kennedy 2008, 246). As Kennedy notes, a popular 
way of introducing unobserved heterogeneity is to use the negative binomial 
distribution (Kennedy 2008, 260). Thus, I use a negative binomial distribution for my 
analysis in this chapter. 
 
I use the level of refugees that have originated from the country as exposure for the 
level of returns. The exposure weights counts by the number of available to be 
counted. Consider: if a small amount of refugees return, this could be because there 
were only a small amount of refugees originating from the country. This is further 




potentially see an increase in the number of refugees being created that same year. 
Using refugees as exposure for returns allows for a proper specification of return. 
 
Finally, since my data is longitudinal, it is appropriate to discuss fixed versus random 
effects. I run Hausman tests on my models to compare the random and fixed effects 
models. This allows me to determine whether to use fixed effects. In cases where the 
Hausman test is significant, random effects is not an appropriate model. Yet when 
possible, random effects are more efficient. Thus, when appropriate, I use fixed 
effects. Where possible, I use random effects. This is noted at the bottom of each 




I hypothesized that direct constraints on the executive would lead to higher levels of 
return to a country that has a refugee agreement in a post-conflict episode. The 
motivation for this hypothesis has been discussed, as has the operationalization of the 
variables. I now evaluate what the data show. The results of the cross-sectional time-










  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees 










Conflict -0.836*** -0.766*** 
 
(0.176) (0.178) 
GDP per Capita -0.164** -0.117 
 
(0.0782) (0.0810) 
Constant -11.27*** -11.95*** 
 
(0.507) (0.535) 
ln_r 0.496 0.00626 
 
(0.465) (0.385) 
ln_s 10.52*** 9.490*** 
 
(0.673) (0.638) 
   Observations 248 262 
Number of PAID 22 23 
Fixed Effects No No 
Log Likelihood -1655 -1660 
Chi Square 31.70 24.61 
Cross Sectional Time Series Negative Binomial Models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The positive coefficients for democracy and executive electoral competitiveness 
indicate support for my hypothesis. The coefficients listed here can be interpreted as 
incident rate ratios by using the exponent of the coefficient. Therefore, in the 
discussion of my results I will refer to an increased rate of return in terms of 
percentage. The formula for arriving at this incident rate ratio is exp(coefficient). 
While holding all else constant, having a meaningful democracy leads to a 63% 
increase in the level of returnees as opposed to countries that are not democracies in 
post-conflict countries with refugee agreements. This is significant at the 99% 





The competitiveness of the electoral process for the executive also has a positive 
effect on the level of returns. While holding all else constant, each increase on the 
scale of executive electoral competition leads to approximately an 11% increase in 
the level of returns. This is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Thus, the models suggest empirical support for my hypothesis regarding direct 
executives constraints having a positive effect on refugee return. Credible 
commitments to returnees via direct constraints on the executive are associated with 
statistically significant higher levels of return. This result holds even while 
controlling for alternative hypotheses such as returns being associated with lower 
levels of violence and higher levels of economic opportunity. These two control 
variables still explain variation some variation in return. The occurrence of violence 
results in less return, and is statistically significant. Increased economic opportunity 
has mixed results, but is associated with less return in model 1. This could be because 
it takes capital to return, and those without money cannot return to a higher cost of 
living. Nonetheless, the credible commitments given via institutional constraints on 
the executive play a role in whether countries experience a higher level of return. 
4.4.2 Legislative 
The next set of hypotheses relate to the legislature. I hypothesize that when 
executives face constraints from their legislature, their commitments to the refugee 
agreement are credible because they will be punished for breaking promises. Thus, 




has been discussed, as has the operationalization of the variables. I now turn to 
statistical analysis. The results of the negative binomial regression are listed in Table 
4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 
        











 Opposition Vote Share 
  
0.0145*** 
   
(0.00403) 
Conflict -0.757*** -0.842*** -0.798*** 
 
(0.176) (0.179) (0.179) 
GDP per Capita -0.0706 -0.121 -0.111 
 
(0.0773) (0.0807) (0.0763) 
Constant -12.48*** -11.98*** -11.67*** 
 
(0.643) (0.542) (0.495) 









    Observations 248 262 268 
Number of PAID 22 23 22 
Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Log Likelihood -1655 -1660 -1473 
Chi Square 27.82 24.37 37.80 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The results suggest support for my hypotheses, with positive coefficients showing a 
relationship between the variables of legislative constraints and higher refugee return. 
Again, I use the exponentiation of the coefficients for interpretation. All else constant, 
countries with multiple parties in the legislature are associated with a 54% increase in 





The effect of increased legislative electoral competition is also a significant indicator 
of increased refugee return. Holding all else constant, the effect of each increase on 
the scale of legislative electoral competition results in a 12% increase in the level of 
return. This is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Finally, the effect of increased vote share for opposition parties is also significant at 
the 99% confidence level. Holding all else constant, the effect of each percentage 
point increase in vote share is associated with a 1% increase in return rates. This 
result is substantively large when considering percentage point increases in vote share 
are associated almost one-to-one with a percentage point increase in return rates. 
 
In Table 4.2 the empirical evidence suggests support for my hypotheses. Greater 
levels of constraint on the executive – through having a more powerful, independent, 
and inclusive legislature – are associated with higher levels of refugee return. This 
result holds even while controlling for common alternative hypotheses. Here, conflict 
still explains whether refugees will return, with statistically significant results in each 
model resulting in less refugee return when violence occurs. However, the economic 
effect is not statistically significant. This suggests that perhaps legislative constraints 
provide an even more powerful explanatory effect than economic explanations. 
Overall, these results suggest that while other factors may still play a role, the role of 




helpful in explaining why some post-conflict countries experience greater returns of 
refugees. 
4.4.3 Power-sharing 
I now turn to my hypotheses regarding power-sharing arrangements. I expect that 
executives experience constraint through power sharing arrangements. Power sharing 
arrangements consist of mandating a position be open in the government to 
opposition groups, which can often be rebel representatives. These can be political, 
military, economic, or territorial. I estimate a count model of returnees as a function 
of whether a country has a power-sharing arrangement. I expect that countries with 
power-sharing arrangements will have lower levels of refugees and greater levels of 
return. Again, I use the most common alternative explanations – violence and 
economic opportunity – as controls. The results are indicated in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Returnees 
    












  Observations 268 
Number of PAID 22 
Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Likelihood -1471 
Chi Square 38.35 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
Standard errors in parentheses 





The results show support for my hypothesis. Holding all else constant, countries that 
have power sharing arrangements have a 109% increase in the level of returnees 
compared to countries that do not have power sharing arrangements. This is 
significant at the 99% confidence level. Thus, credible commitments via power 
sharing institutions appear to lead to greater refugee return. 
 
In this model, the controls for alternative reasons refugees might return also maintain 
some explanatory power. Countries where violence occurs experience significantly 
lower levels of refugee return. However, better economic conditions do not attract 
greater refugee return in this model, as GDP per capita is not significant. Nonetheless, 
the importance of credible commitments via constraining institutions cannot be 
overlooked. They hold up even when taking these alternative explanations into 
account. 
4.4.4 General Model 
I now turn to a general model encompassing all of the variables. While evidence thus 
far has shown that credible commitments are important for influencing return in a 
variety of settings, this model aims to evaluate which types of credible commitments 
are most effective. For this general model, I include one variable from my models on 
executive, legislative, and power sharing constraints. For executive constraints, I use 
the measure for democracy. For legislative constraints on the executive, I use the 
percent of opposition vote share. And finally, for power sharing, I use the same 




This general model evaluates the effect of specific types of credible commitments, 
while holding each other type constant. The results are listed in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Returnees 




Opposition Vote Share 0.0136*** 
 
(0.00425) 












  Observations 248 
Number of PAID 22 
Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Likelihood -1386 
Chi Square 67.37 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results show that credible commitments have a statistically significant, positive 
effect on refugee returns even while holding various commitment types constant. 
Holding all else constant, having a democracy results in a 40% increase in the rate of 
returnees compared to non-democracies. This is statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level. Conventional confidence levels require 95% confidence, so this 





Holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in opposition vote share in 
the legislature results in a 1% increase in the rate of return. This is statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level. 
 
Holding all else constant, having a power sharing arrangement results in a 204% 
increase in the rate of returnees as compared to countries that do not have power 
sharing arrangements. This is significant at the 99% confidence level. This is a quite 
substantively significant increase in the level of returnees. 
 
Again, I find that these results hold not only when accounting for other commitment 
types, but also when controlling for alternative hypotheses. Conflict and GDP per 
capita are both statistically significant predictors of a decreased rate of refugee return. 
The fact that violence leads to less return is not surprising, since it is a determining 
factor in the creation of the crisis in the first place. However, a decrease in return 
rates due to an increased GDP per capita is surprising. This result could be because of 
the need for capital to return. However, the important result is that the constraining 
institutions are associated with greater rates of return even while accounting for these 
factors. 
4.4.5 Discussion 
The results of the country-level count models ultimately provide support for my 
hypotheses. The effect of each type of constraint on the executive is a significant 
predictor of refugee return. Thus, I find evidence that credible commitments of 




that isolates for the effect of each variable separately, each type of credible 
commitment predicts higher refugee return. This provides strong support for the idea 
that credible commitments lead to higher refugee return – even when controlling for 
alternative explanations such as an end to violence and a higher economic 
opportunity. However, this is not the entire story. From here I turn to a discussion of 
the networks of return. I measure returns by dyad, rather than country-year, so as to 
measure the effect of institutions not just in the country of return, but also what 
refugees experienced in the country of asylum.   
4.5 Explaining Returnee Networks 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
To evaluate my next set of hypotheses, I need to evaluate the networks of return. Here 
I evaluate two countries: the country of origin is the post-conflict country. This is the 
country from where the refugees originated. This is the country to which they will 
perhaps return. The country of asylum is the country to which the refugees fled 
during the conflict. This is the country from which they will perhaps return. 
Conditions in the country of asylum may be an important factor in the decision to 
return. From my theoretical expectations, I expect that returns will be more likely 
when the country of origin makes a more credible commitment to return than the 
country of asylum. In operation, I expect that this will occur when the country of 
origin has greater constraints on the executive than the country of asylum. I expect 
this to be the case because if the commitments to distribute resources in the home 




where the commitments and signals to refugees are most credible. This has been 
developed in the theoretical section, so the discussion here turns to the 
operationalization of the concepts into variables and the analysis of the empirical 
models.   
4.5.2 The Data 
The dependent variable is the number of returned refugees between country dyads by 
year. I use the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data on 
returns, which includes the country of asylum and country of origin. This dataset 
covers the world’s refugees starting in 2000. When I refer to the country of origin, I 
mean the country to which the refugees are returning, and by the country of asylum I 
mean the country where they were temporarily staying as refugees.  
 
Since I am interested in the implementation of post-conflict refugee agreements, I 
constricted this dataset to dyads where the country of origin 1) was in a post-conflict 
period and 2) had an agreement pertaining to the return of refugees. I used both the 
UCDP data on conflict termination and the UCDP data on peace agreements (Kreutz 
2010; Högbladh 2011) to determine these time periods in the same fashion as in the 
first dataset in this chapter. This information covers through the end of 2009. Because 
UNHCR data on returnee dyads begins in 2000, the final network dataset covers the 
10 years from 2000-2009.  
 
The scope of cases consists of all countries of asylum that are holding refugees during 




peace agreement addressing refugee return. I use the UNHCR database to cover both 
refugee and returnee information between the dyad. UNHCR measures the number of 
refugees as the stock of refugees being held by the asylum country from each origin 
country, and the number of returned refugees as the flow that occurred between that 
asylum and origin country during the year. Thus, the number of refugees may not 
have all left the origin country during the same year, but they are the scope of 
possible refugees that may seek return. The question then becomes, which dyads saw 
a greater amount of refugees return. This dyad structure is the key difference from the 
first half of the chapter. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables here are the same as the previous analysis, with an 
important caveat. They are measured as the difference in the returnee’s country of 
origin from the country of asylum. This is referred to in network analysis as the 
homophilly (Kolaczyk & Csárdi 2014, 91). This concept allows us to examine the 
likelihood of flow between the two nodes as a measure of difference in the attributes 
of the two nodes. My explanatory variables cover three main areas: constraint on the 
executive directly, constraint on the executive through legislatures, and constraint on 
the executive through power sharing institutions. 
 
I make use of two measures of direct constraint on the executive to test my first set of 
hypotheses. The first, democracy, is the same measure of democracy as introduced 




democracy in the country of origin, subtracted from the level of democracy in the 
country of asylum. This means that higher values of democracy indicate that 
democracy exists in the country of origin but not the country of asylum, while lower 
values of democracy indicate that democracy exists in the country of asylum but not 
the country of origin. This differentiation allows for analysis including the institutions 
in both countries. 
 
The second measure I use is the level of competitiveness in the executive. Again, this 
is the same measure of executive electoral competition introduced earlier in this 
chapter. Here the measure for executive competition is the level of competition for 
the executive in the country of origin subtracted from the level of competition in the 
country of asylum. Thus, higher scores of this variable indicate higher levels of 
executive office competition in the country of origin as compared to the country of 
asylum, while lower scores indicate the country of asylum has higher levels of 
executive competition as compared to the country of origin. 
 
I make use of three measures of the ability of legislatures to provide a constraint on 
the executive. These are the same variables introduced in the first part of this chapter. 
As with the other explanatory variables in this analysis, the measure of parties is the 
difference between the level of party participation in the country of origin and the 
country of asylum. Higher values indicate that there is higher party participation in 
the country of origin, as compared to the country of asylum. The measure of 




This is also measured as the difference between the country of origin and the country 
of asylum: higher values of this variable indicate higher levels of legislative 
competition in the country of origin, as compared to the country of asylum. The 
measure of opposition vote in this dataset measures the difference between the 
country of origin and the country of asylum. Higher values of this variable thus 
indicate that the percentage of vote share for the opposition party in the country of 
origin are higher than the percentage of vote share for the opposition in the country of 
asylum. 
 
Finally, I measure power sharing arrangements. These arrangements could include 
political power sharing, military power sharing, economic power sharing and 
territorial power sharing. The measure I use captures all of these, and is the same 
variable as introduced earlier in this chapter. The main distinction here is that it is 
measured in terms of the difference between the country of origin and the country of 
asylum. Thus, higher scores indicate that power sharing existed in the country of 
origin as compared to the country of asylum, whereas lower values indicate that the 
country of asylum has power sharing arrangements where the country of origin does 
not. 
 
For each model, I also include the most common explanations for refugee return, as I 
did previously: violence and economics. In addition, I can now add information on 
the distance between the dyad. This adds a control for the cost of return. It can be 




I again make use of the homophilly: higher numbers indicate a higher level of either 
violence or GDP per capita in the country of origin as compared to the country of 
asylum. The distance between them is measured using their geographic coordinates 
and the Pythagorean theorem.  
 
The following is a summary of variables in the dyad-level dataset. The names are the 
same as earlier in this chapter, yet they now often include negative values that 
indicate differences between asylum and origin countries. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Returnees 2136 378.80 3787.01 0.00 82000.00 
Refugees 2136 1751.96 14652.69 1.00 352640.00 
Democracy 1796 0.01 0.62 -1.00 1.00 
Executive Electoral 
Competitiveness 2126 -0.69 2.45 -6.00 6.00 
Parties in Legislature 1796 0.04 0.51 -1.00 2.00 
Legislative Electoral 
Competitiveness 2127 -0.43 2.12 -6.00 6.00 
Opposition Vote Share 2128 -6.70 32.81 -83.55 75.10 
Power Sharing 2136 0.68 0.49 -1.00 1.00 
Log GDP per Capita 2123 -2.88 1.68 -6.15 1.87 
Conflict 2136 0.02 0.44 -1.00 1.00 
Distance 2136 52.33 36.90 0.00 191.75 
 
 
4.5.3 The Model 
The model is a count model, used to determine the expected count of returnees given 
the difference in executive constraints between the country of asylum and the country 
of origin. The model uses a negative binomial distribution and uses the number of 
refugees existing in the dyad as exposure. I use the log of GDP per capita, but no 





I run Hausman tests on each model so that I can determine if the model is more 
appropriately fit with fixed effects or random effects. When the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test is not rejected, I use random effects, as it is a more efficient estimator. 
However, when the null hypothesis is rejected, I use fixed effects for the model since 
the random effects model is no longer a consistent estimator. 
4.5.4 Results 
4.5.4.1 Executive 
I hypothesized that credible commitments via direct constraints on executives in the 
country of origin as compared to the country of asylum will increase the likelihood of 
return in post-conflict refugee agreement countries. The motivation for this 
hypothesis and the operationalization of the variables has been discussed, so I now 
turn to analysis of the model. The first column represents the results of the model for 
the measure of democracy, while the second column represents the results of the 
model for the measure of electoral competitiveness for executive elections. The 












  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees 










GDP per Capita 0.0223 -0.0746 
 
(0.104) (0.0962) 
Conflict -0.830*** -0.882*** 
 
(0.121) (0.120) 
Distance 0.0578*** 0.0456*** 
 
(0.00985) (0.00981) 
Constant -10.57*** -9.961*** 
 
(0.147) (0.118) 
ln_r -1.873*** -1.768*** 
 
(0.136) (0.125) 
ln_s -2.216*** -2.206*** 
 
(0.315) (0.306) 
   Observations 1,789 2,118 
Number of Dyads 433 529 
Fixed Effects No No 
Log Likelihood -1633 -1866 
Chi Square 180.3 207.9 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The results provide support for my hypothesis that executive constraints in the 
country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum will result in an increased rate 
of refugee return. As with previous models, I interpret the results here by using the 
exponent of the coefficients. This allows for interpretation of the incidence rate ratio. 
Holding all else constant, having a democracy in the country of origin as opposed to 
the country of asylum results in a 124% increase in the rate of refugee return. This is 





Holding all else constant, the effect of each increased on the scale of executive 
electoral competitiveness in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum 
results in a 19% increase in the rate of refugee return. This is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. 
 
These two models suggest support for my hypothesis that executive constraints matter 
along the networks of return. In both models, the alternative hypothesis that higher 
GDP per capita will lead to refugee return is not a statistically significant predictor of 
return. However, the alternative hypothesis that continued violence will result in 
fewer returnees is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Counter to 
intuition, greater distances between dyads are associated with greater returns, and are 
statistically significant with 99% confidence. The distance result is puzzling, but it 
may suggest that those further away from the conflict perhaps have a greater ability to 
return. Ultimately, these results show that while other factors may still influence 
returns between dyads, direct constraints on the executive are an important factor in 
predicting return. While it is important to end violence, it is not the whole story. I find 
support for my hypothesis that refugees will return based on the credibility of the 
commitment to the policies that affect their access to resources. 
4.5.4.2 Legislative 
I also hypothesized that when the country of origin has greater legislative constraints 
on the executive than the country of asylum, the rate of return should increase due to 




better able to constrain the executive, the executive is more likely to follow through 
on its agreement and such institutions signal to refugees that return is viable.  
 
I use three measures to explore legislative constraints on the executive in the country 
of origin as opposed to the country of asylum. The first is whether the legislature has 
multiple parties. The second is the level of competitiveness in the legislature and the 
third is the opposition vote share. All three are measured as a comparison of origin 
and asylum countries. The motivation for use of these variables has already been 
discussed, and we now turn to the evidence these concepts provide. The results are 


















  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 
        











 Opposition Vote Share 
  
0.00964*** 
   
(0.00183) 
GDP per Capita 0.130 0.0431 0.170* 
 
(0.106) (0.0956) (0.0936) 
Conflict -1.011*** -1.184*** -0.959*** 
 
(0.112) (0.107) (0.111) 
Distance 0.0585*** 0.0452*** 0.0491*** 
 
(0.0107) (0.0102) (0.00986) 
Constant -10.24*** -10.07*** -10.14*** 
 
(0.128) (0.122) (0.125) 
ln_r -1.889*** -1.755*** -1.774*** 
 
(0.138) (0.125) (0.125) 
ln_s -2.279*** -1.991*** -1.858*** 
 
(0.326) (0.352) (0.367) 
    Observations 1,789 2,118 2,118 
Number of Dyads 433 529 529 
Fixed Effects No No No 
Log Likelihood -1649 -1884 -1883 
Chi Square 175.5 190.3 188.1 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The model provides support for my hypothesis that legislative constraints increase the 
level of return. Holding all else constant, the effect of having multiple parties in the 
legislature in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum results in a 
50% increase in the rate of refugee return. This is significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Holding all else constant, the effect of each increase in the scale of legislative 
electoral competition in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum is a 




level. Holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in opposition vote 
share in the legislature in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum 
results in a 1% increase in the rate of return. This is significant at the 99% confidence 
level.  
 
These results support my hypothesis that increased legislative constraints on the 
executive lead to higher levels of return. This reinforces the importance of credible 
commitments in both the home and asylum countries. In these models, increased 
economic opportunity is only a significant predictor of increased rate of return when 
considering opposition vote share. This again suggests only weak support for the 
alternative hypothesis that economic opportunity will lead to greater return rates. As 
expected, the occurrence of violence leads to a significantly lower rate of refugee 
return. Further, as occurred previously, increased distance between origin and asylum 
is associated with an increased rate of return. This is puzzling, yet the results show 
that even when accounting for these alternative hypotheses, the importance of 
constraining institutions that produce credibility to commitments made by 
governments to refugees that might return cannot be overlooked.  
4.5.4.3 Power Sharing 
I hypothesized that credible commitments via power sharing that exists in the country 
of origin as compared to the country of asylum will increase the likelihood of return. I 
use a measure of power sharing in the country of origin as compared to the country of 




been discussed, so I now turn to the model analysis. The results are listed in Table 
4.7. 
Table 4.7 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Returnees 
    
Power Sharing 0.232* 
 
(0.135) 


















  Observations 2,123 
Number of Dyads 531 
Fixed Effects No 
Log Likelihood -1906 
Chi Square 171.9 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results suggest some support for my hypothesis. Holding all else constant, the 
effect of having power sharing arrangements in the country of origin as compared to 
the country of asylum is a 22% increase in the rate of return. This is statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level. While lower than the conventional 95% 





In this model, conflict continues to be a significant predictor of lower rates of refugee 
return. Higher GDP per capita in the country of origin as opposed to the country of 
asylum is not a statistically significant predictor of return. Again, increased distance 
between dyads is associated with statistically significant higher levels of return. These 
results are similar to previous models, yet again they show that the importance of 
constraining institutions cannot be overlooked. Such institutions are associated with 
increased rates of refugee return even when controlling for these other factors. 
4.5.4.4 General Model 
Having found general support my hypotheses concerning increased institutional 
constraints between country dyads, I now turn to a general model that considers each 
type of credible commitment by holding the others constant. Similar to the general 
model in the previous section, I again evaluate this model using democracy to 
measure constraints on the executive, opposition vote share to measure constraints on 
the executive through the legislature, and power sharing to measure the constraints on 
the executive through power sharing arrangements. Again, the variables are measured 
as the difference between the country of asylum and country of origin. The results of 











  (1) 
VARIABLES Returnees 




Opposition Vote Share 0.0105*** 
 
(0.00305) 
Power Sharing 0.166 
 
(0.169) 


















  Observations 1,785 
Number of Dyads 431 
Fixed Effects No 
Log Likelihood -1616 
Chi Square 190.6 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The effect of specific credible commitments varies in this model. Holding all else 
constant, the effect of having a democracy in the home country as opposed to the 
country of asylum results in a 48% increase in the rate of return. This is statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in opposition vote share in 




1% increase in the rate of return. This is statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level. 
 
The effect of having power sharing in the country of origin as opposed to the country 
of asylum is not statistically significant. Thus, it appears that the strongest credible 
commitment between dyads of countries is democracy and opposition vote share in 
the legislature.  
 
4.5.4.5 Discussion 
The results between refugee country dyads show some support for my hypothesis that 
credible commitments explain refugee return. Multiple measures of credible 
commitment hold up to controls. Thus, I conclude that credible commitments to 
refugee policies are important in terms of the country of origin, but also in terms of 
what is promised in the country of asylum. When such credible commitments are 
considered in relation to one another – both democratic and legislative constraints are 
associated with increased refugee return. The loss of power sharing as a significant 
predictor of refugee return in the general model casts some doubt on that particular 
institution, but the general hypothesis about credible commitments through 
constraints on the executive still holds. I find statistical support for the hypothesis that 
credible commitments via constraints on the executive in the home country as 
opposed to the country of asylum will lead to higher rates of return. While not all 
constraints on the executive work equally, the fact that some constraints seem to have 




Chapter 5: Explaining Commitment Types 
This chapter turns to empirical evaluation of my next set of hypotheses regarding the 
commitments themselves: returnee provisions in peace agreements. The return 
provisions data will be discussed at length, and then I will turn to an evaluation of my 
hypotheses given these data. The hypothesis is that these commitments are not 
credible, no matter the type. Credible commitments exist through institutions that 
constrain the executive. Refugee provisions in peace agreements come in a few broad 
categories: security provisions, housing land and property (HLP) provisions, 
financial, and political provisions. I consider each of these a commitment. Yet, each 
requires credibility to be an effective driver for refugee return. I begin by exploring 
these and explaining how I coded the data from the peace agreements. I then turn to 
the evaluation of the hypotheses. 
5.1 Refugee Agreement Data  
I created a dataset covering the provisions in refugee agreements by coding whether 
such provisions were present in the full text of refugee return agreements. I relied on 
the text concerning refugees listed in the Peace Agreement Matrix (Joshi, Quinn and 
Regan 2015). I cross-referenced this information with the list of agreements citing 
return from the UCDP peace agreement database (Högbladh 2011). This database 
also links to full text of agreements.  
 
I coded this data based upon commonly held notions of what parts of the agreement 




and amount of guarantees that are proposed for refugees. Agreements can range from 
a few sentences that allow for refugee return, to multiple sections outlining the details 
of return and returnee management. 
 
I coded for 1) unspecified guarantees 2) financial guarantees 3) property guarantees 
4) political guarantees (such as voting rights) 5) legal documents (such as citizenship 
ID) 6) security guarantees 7) guarantees of access to resources (food, water, farming, 
education) 8) and guarantees of assistance to women. These categories are not 
mutually exclusive. The refugee sections of peace agreements may have referred to 
more than one of these categories.   
 
I coded other variables that do not play a central role in my analysis. For further 
information on these, see Appendix II. Appendix II has information on the codebook. 
I code for objectives (return, reintegration, resettlement) as well as whether there was 
a specific implementation commission set up for refugee return. Also, I included 
whether a timetable was given for the refugee provisions specifically.  
 
The assistance commitment variables that I coded are disaggregated, yet for this 
analysis I file them under categories that are theoretically important in the literature. 
Refugees that return require assistance in two main areas: socioeconomic 
commitments and security commitments. For this analysis, the socioeconomic 
commitments consist of financial, property, political, legal, resource access, and 




coded under security. Finally, I made use of the total number of assistance 
commitments proposed. From my theoretical expectations, I argued that more 
commitments might encourage refugees to return. Thus, I produced a variable 
measuring the total of all the commitments. I connected this data to the dataset 
compiled. 
5.2 Commitments to Physical Security 
Perhaps most common commitment is the provision for security. Security provisions 
in regards to refugees take a few different angles. They may guarantee safety of 
movement back into the country, general safety throughout the country, or safety 
specific to the area to which refugees return. The latter may consist of increased 
police presence, security sector reforms, or activities such as de-mining. Additionally, 
security commitments may come in multiple forms in the same peace agreement. For 
example, an agreement may provide for security of return and demining in the area of 
origin. Or, an agreement may provide for security of return only. However, all 
security provisions guarantee the physical safety of refugees. Overall, security 
commitments of this nature are found in 11 out of the 24 agreements examined, or 
46%. 
 
Provisions that guarantee physical security for returning refugees can be quite 
specific, outlining precisely the actions the government must take. For example, in 
Guatemala’s Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace, the provision for security 
aimed specifically at the removal of explosive devices so that returnees could return 




4. Concerned about the security of those who are being resettled or who live 
in the zones affected by the conflict, the Parties recognize the urgent need to 
remove all types of mines or explosive devices buried or abandoned in these 
areas, and they commit themselves to cooperate fully in these activities. (PAM 
2015) 
 
Provisions like this one address specific needs for physical security that refugees face. 
Particularly in rural countries, landmine removal is imperative because returnees will 
not be able to access the land if it is littered with landmines. Specific commitments 
such as this may vary across conflicts, yet I seek to evaluate whether the specificity of 
commitments of physical security credibly signal that return is a viable option.  
 
Other examples of physical security commitments often come in the form of 
guaranteed safety during the process of return itself. This is important because 
refugees may fear a return because of the likelihood of being attacked or harassed as 
they cross back into the country. Such commitments are stated in Georgia’s 
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgia/Abkhaz Conflict: 
4. The Parties agree to cooperate and to interact in planning and conducting 
the activities aimed to safeguard and guarantee the safe, secure and dignified 
return of people who have fled from areas of the conflict zone to the areas of 
their previous permanent residence.   
5. For the purpose of the present agreement, the parties will guarantee the 
safety of refugees and displaced persons in the course of the voluntary 
repatriation and rehabilitation operations to be organized.  (PAM 2015) 
 
Again, this addresses specific concerns that returning refugees have. Refugees leave 
because their country of origin was unable to provide them with protection. Thus, 
commitments such as this are meant to assure returnees that they will now be 




as these would increase return; however, without a credible commitment to stick with 
these provisions, I argue that they will not increase refugee return. 
 
Other physical security commitments address only general security. Commitments of 
this nature establish that security must be guaranteed, but are not specific as to where 
or how. For example, in El Salvador’s Chapultepec Peace Agreement, the provision 
merely states that security will be guaranteed:  
3. Full guarantees and security for the return of exiles, war-wounded and other 
persons currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict. 
(PAM 2015) 
 
This is a common type of non-specific commitment. Other commitments like this 
include Burundi’s Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement: 
(c) Return must be voluntary and must take place in dignity with guaranteed 
security, and taking into account the particular vulnerability of women and 
children (PAM) 
 
These general physical security commitments do not outline whether the security is to 
be given during the journey or in the area of return specifically. However, such 
commitments of security could intuitively signal that returns will be secure, 
encouraging refugee returns. However, my hypothesis is that theses provisions will 
not encourage returns, and that it is the political institutions that provide credibility to 
these commitments. 
 
Finally, physical security commitments might be related to refugee return by 
guaranteeing physical security to the humanitarian agencies that are seeking to assist 




helping refugees return. Often the majority of assistance given to refugees is from the 
humanitarian organizations that are present in the country, particularly UNHCR. 
Thus, such commitments might also be viewed as important. In Liberia’s Accra Peace 
Agreement, the provision is stated as follows: 
1. (a) The Parties re-affirm the commitment made in the Ceasefire Agreement, 
to provide security guarantees for safe and unhindered access by all 
humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups throughout the country, in order 
to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with 
international conventions, principles and norms governing humanitarian 
operations. 
(b) Accordingly, the Parties agree to guarantee the security and movement of 
humanitarian personnel, that of their properties, goods transported, stocked or 
distributed, as well as their projects and beneficiaries. (PAM 2015) 
 
All told, security provisions can vary. Yet they all include basic commitments of 
physical security to reestablish government protection of citizens. In my coding, I 
include any provisions for security that fall under these categories as security 
provisions. While each post-conflict agreement establishes security commitments 
specific to its own crisis, each establishes commitments to security that one might 
intuitively assume provide signals of safety to returnees. For my coding, I consider an 
agreement to have security guarantees if it has a minimum of 1 of these. Some 
agreements have more than one, but to be included the agreement must have at least 
one provision for security of returnees. 
 
Interestingly, not all post-conflict agreements guarantee the safety of returning 
refugees. Thus – when examining refugee returns – one might expect that a certain 
amount of leverage could be gained by examining whether or not security provisions 




guarantees won’t matter unless the political situation is conducive to establishing the 
conditions: institutions that make these commitments credible must be present in 
order for returns to increase. 
5.3 Socioeconomic Commitments 
Socioeconomic commitments are another type of commitment made in refugee return 
agreements. Social and economic commitments – if implemented – can help to lower 
the cost of return. Assistance commitments of this nature tend to be more specific to 
the needs of returnees to each country, yet they carry common threads. 
Socioeconomic commitments seek to establish political rights to returnees and to 
reinsert them into the economic and social fabric of the country. Commitments of this 
nature may include one or more aspects of socioeconomic assistance. Thus, while 
each refugee agreement is different, I include socioeconomic commitments as a larger 
measure to leverage whether overarching themes such as these provide incentive for 
return. I include different measures of socioeconomic commitments under one 
measure because agreements often have more than one socioeconomic guarantee. For 
example, the guarantee of documents often comes along with the right to political 
participation. Access to economic resources is often tied to direct financial assistance. 
Thus, by considering these as an aggregate measure, I hope to leverage the larger 
theme of socioeconomic incentive that might occur. Overall, socioeconomic 
guarantees such as those that I code here exist in 14 out of 24 agreements, or 58%. 
 
I coded a number of different factors that make up such provisions, such as 




documents, as well as guarantees of amnesty to returning refugees for any 
participation in rebellion and guarantees that focus on gender concerns. Further, I 
coded for direct financial assistance, assistance with property return or new property 
distribution, and guarantees of access to resources. 
 
First, consider provisions that guarantee documents for participation in politics. 
Refugees often have difficulty proving their land ownership, citizenship, or voter 
registration due to the destruction of property or loss of records. In fact, since post-
conflict elections have become a central focus in many post-conflict periods, voter 
registration is particularly important.  
 
Many agreements thus establish commitments to provide such documentation. For 
example, Guatemala’s Agreement for Firm and Lasting Peace went to great lengths in 
Section 7 to outline the political and legal documents that would be provided for 
returnees so that they can enjoy “basic services” and “political rights”. The text is 
quite extensive and outlines steps to provide documents, register individuals, and 
ensure that the displaced can enjoy citizenship rights. 
7. The lack of personal documentation for the majority of the uprooted 
population groups increases their vulnerability and limits their access to basic 
services and the enjoyment of their civil and political rights. This problem 
requires urgent solutions. Consequently, the Parties agree that the following 
steps are necessary: 
7.1. In order to arrange for the documentation of uprooted persons as soon as 
possible, the Government, with the cooperation of the international 
community, shall intensify its efforts to streamline the necessary mechanisms, 
taking into account, where appropriate, the registers kept by the uprooted 
communities themselves; 
7.2. Decree No. 70-91, a provisional act concerning replacement and 




be revised so as to establish a system adapted to the needs of all the affected 
population groups, with streamlined, free-of-charge registration procedures. 
For such purposes, the views of the affected sectors shall be taken into 
account. Personal documentation and identification shall be completed as soon 
as possible; 
7.3. The necessary administrative rules to streamline formalities to ensure that 
children of uprooted persons born outside the country are registered as native 
Guatemalans, in compliance with article 144 of the Constitution of the 
Republic, shall be promulgated; 
7.4. For the implementation of this documentation programme, the 
Government shall request the cooperation of the United Nations and the 
international community. (PAM 2015) 
 
This program is far more extensive than many other social commitments. The 
commitments here are specific and outlined in detail. However, other refugee 
agreements provide similar commitments for documentation. In El Salvador’s 
Chapultepec Agreement, commitments were far less detailed but also sought to 
provide documentation so as to allow citizens to enjoy political rights:  
I. Respect for and Guarantee of Human Rights 
7. Displaced persons and returnees shall be provided with the identity 
documents required by law and shall be guaranteed freedom of movement. 
They shall also be guaranteed the freedom to carry on their economic 
activities and to exercise their political and social rights within the framework 
of the country's institutions (PAM 2015) 
 
Such commitments might intuitively provide incentive for returnees because 
participation in politics allows for voice and allocation of resources. Thus, I will 
consider these commitments in terms of the level of credibility that they have. While 
the text guaranteeing documentation can vary, the overall concept is similar. For this 
reason I coded guarantees such as these as socioeconomic guarantees.  
 
Beyond documentation, the right to participation is of equal importance for refugees 




commitments that are focused more specifically on political rights such as enabling 
returnees to participate in elections. In post-conflict Cambodia, one of the main areas 
of focus was to enable citizens to vote in the elections. In that context Cambodia’s 
Paris Agreement specifically made provisions for returnees to take part in elections – 
and gave repatriation a sense of urgency. 
Part V. Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Article 19 
Upon entry into force of this Agreement, every effort will be made to create in 
Cambodia political, economic and social conditions conducive to the 
voluntary return and harmonious integration of Cambodian refugees and 
displaced persons. 
6. With a view to ensuring that refugees and displaced persons participate in 
the elections, mass repatriation should commence and be completed as soon as 
possible, taking into account all the political, humanitarian, logistical, 
technical and socio-economic factors involved, and with the cooperation of 
the SNC. (PAM) 
 
Cambodia’s agreement makes specific reference to the ability of returnees to 
participate in the social and economic environment of the country through political 
participation. For this reason, provisions such as this are included under 
socioeconomic commitments. While different from other countries due to the specific 
concerns in this country, political commitments might intuitively give incentive to 
refugees to engage in return. For this reason I aim to evaluate them in terms of the 
credibility of such commitment. 
 
As further evidence of socioeconomic commitments – consider how amnesty plays a 
role in the participation in social life. Political commitments that tie social and 
economic life with being forgiven for any wrongdoing during the conflict should 




Declaration tied social, political, and economic guarantees to a commitment not to 
“institute criminal proceedings”.  
7. The Commission shall have the following functions and powers: 
Implementing measures for the safe and appropriate return of the refugees and 
their active involvement in the social, political and economic life of the 
country, and provision of assistance in reconstruction of the housing and 
industrial and agricultural facilities destroyed by the warfare. 
2. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan assumes the obligation to 
reintegrate returning refugees and displaced persons into the social and 
economic life of the country, which includes the provision to them of 
humanitarian and financial aid, assistance in finding employment and housing 
and the restoration of all their rights as citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan 
(including the return to them of dwellings and property and guaranteed 
uninterrupted service), and not to institute criminal proceedings against 
returning refugees or displaced persons for their participation in the political 
confrontation and the civil war, in accordance with the legislative acts in force 
in the Republic. (PAM 2015) 
 
Thus, including amnesty for returnees in a country’s socioeconomic commitments 
should allow returnees to take advantage of activities such as reconstruction of 
housing, facilitation of agriculture, financial aid including assistance in finding 
employment. Refugees are those that have a well-founded fear of persecution in their 
home country. Thus, commitments like this may be an important incentive for 
refugees to return. While amnesty commitments like this vary by country, I include 
them in socioeconomic commitments for this reason. However, as stated, I expect that 
political institutions are needed to make these commitments credible. I evaluate this 
in the empirical models in this chapter. 
 
Direct financial commitments are also an important socioeconomic commitment 
included in many refugee agreements. These commitments step further than the 




specific to each country, direct financial assistance is common. In Rwanda, the 
agreement specifically guaranteed that returnees would be paid so as to meet vital 
needs.  
Article 14 
Upon their arrival in the country, repatriates shall each be paid a small amount 
of money to enable them to meet vital needs not catered for by the aid 
programme. (PAM 2015) 
 
Direct payments should allow returnees to survive for a short period of time until they 
can reintegrate into economic and political life. Often, payments may not be large 
enough to buy property or rebuild, but they can provide for basic necessities. 
Agreements such as these should provide incentive for refugee return in that returnees 
will know that assistance will be provided. However – without institutions to provide 
credibility – such commitments may not provide this incentive. 
 
Direct financial assistance may also come in the form of directly inserting returnees 
back into the economy. In Mali, the agreement went so far as to outline the creation 
of a specific fund for returnees. Mali’s National Pact agreement made provisions for 
assisting returnees with “reinsertion” in industry as well as for compensation for the 
consequences of the conflict. Mali’s provisions:  
11. The reinsertion of displaced populations and the assistance to victims of 
all the consequences of the armed conflict in Northern Mali will give rise to 
the creation of two Funds: 
-a Fund for development and reinsertion, which will support the creation of 
small and medium-sized industries, and small and medium-sized enterprises, 
and the insertion of the displaced populations into production systems, 
-a Fund for assistance and compensation to civil and military victims of the 
two parties and their heirs, for all the consequences of the armed conflict. This 
Fund will compensate as a priority, victims identified by the Independent 





The provisions here are more detailed in nature and emphasize not only direct 
assistance, but also reinsertion in economic life. This may create a socioeconomic 
incentive for refugees to return, and thus I include this as a socioeconomic 
commitment. Yet, I expect that political institutions are needed to create the 
credibility behind this commitment. 
 
Socioeconomic commitments may specifically address property and property 
restitution. Property is one of the more important issues facing returnees because 
without it returnees lack access to shelter and livelihoods. Returnees may need new 
areas in which to resettle, or may require restitution of their former homes. 
Commitments such as this are central to refugee concerns. This was the case in 
Mozambique. Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement outlined that refugees would 
be guaranteed restitution of their property as well guaranteed the right to take legal 
action to retake it. 
(e) Mozambican refugees and displaced persons shall be guaranteed 
restitution of property owned by them which is still in existence and the right 
to take legal action to secure the return of such property from individuals in 
possession of it. (PAM 2015) 
 
Property is often destroyed, taken, and disputed. Thus, resolution of property rights 
should be an important socioeconomic incentive for return. I include this as a 
socioeconomic commitment, yet I expect that political institutions will provide 






Finally, socioeconomic commitments cover vulnerable groups such as women. 
Refugees are often made up of the most vulnerable in society. Women and children 
may return without equal access to political and economic life. Thus, agreements that 
address these vulnerable groups should provide incentive for return. Burundi’s 
agreement made specific guarantees to women, by granting them equal access to 
socioeconomic commitments. Burundi’s Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
sought specifically to avoid discrimination against women in resettlement and 
reintegration. 
(c) Return must be voluntary and must take place in dignity with guaranteed 
security, and taking into account the particular vulnerability of women and 
children;  
(h) In the return of the refugees and the resettlement and reintegration of the 
returnees and displaced and regrouped persons, the principle of equity, 
including gender equity, must be strictly applied in order to avoid any 
measure or treatment that discriminates against or favours any one among 
these categories. (PAM 2015) 
 
Because returning refugees are often groups that consist of vulnerable populations 
that are discriminated against, provisions that ensure anti-discrimination should 
provide an important incentive for return. For this reason I include provisions like this 
under socioeconomic commitments. However, as stated, I expect that political 
institutions are needed to provide credible commitment to provisions such as these. I 
examine the aggregate measure of socioeconomic commitments because I want to 






As discussed in the theoretical section, one might expect that the detail and 
commitment type matters for increasing the level of return. It makes intuitive sense 
that having more detailed commitments, or more commitments overall would 
encourage and facilitate return. However, these commitment types provide no 
leverage for explaining refugee return because they fail to credibly commit the 
government to enacting them. While leaders can make these promises, they face no 
repercussions for breaking them. Without punishment for reneging, commitments 
may not become policy. The following statistical models provide evidence for these 
hypotheses. 
5.4 Results of Non-Credible Commitment Models 
I now turn to evaluation of the specific provision types. In this chapter I use the same 
country-level and dyad-level datasets that I used in Chapter 4. The models are the 
same: cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models. I also use the same set of 
variables to establish constraint-type as I did in the general models in Chapter 4: 
democracy, opposition vote share and power sharing. I use the number of returnees as 
the dependent variable and the number of refugees as the exposure. I control for 
violence and economic opportunity, and where applicable, distance. For a larger 
discussion of these models, see Chapter 4. Here I simply make the addition of the 








Summary of Variables in Country-level Dataset: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Returnees 400 22035.48 109358.00 0.00 1410782.00 
Refugees 470 121409.40 243717.00 1.00 2257573.00 
Socioeconomic 
Provisions 483 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Security Provisions 318 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Total Provisions 318 2.37 2.27 0.00 7.00 
Democracy 432 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Executive Electoral 
Competitiveness 458 5.42 2.05 1.00 7.00 
Parties in Legislature 432 1.61 0.72 0.00 2.00 
Legislative Electoral 
Competitiveness 458 5.83 1.92 1.00 7.00 
Opposition Vote Share 483 14.98 19.79 0.00 75.10 
Power Sharing 483 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Conflict 460 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Log GDP per Capita 446 6.37 1.12 4.17 9.67 
 
 
The models provided below present the statistical evidence following the coding of 
refugee agreement provisions. As noted in the table, I use aggregated measures for 
security and socioeconomic commitments. I also include a measure for “total 
commitments” which is the total number of disaggregated commitments. This allows 
for an examination of the intuition that more commitments of either socioeconomic or 
security nature should provide incentive to return home. Ultimately I argue that these 
are not credible commitments. Credible commitments must come through political 
institutions that provide constraint on the ability to renege. 
 
5.4.1 Assistance Commitments and Executive Constraints 
I now turn to evaluating the aspects of the agreement in terms of direct constraints on 




constraint on the executive are needed to increase refugee return. The type of 
provision or the amount of provisions in the agreement should not matter because 
they are not credible on their own. These models measure the effect of socioeconomic 
provisions, security provisions, and total provisions on the likelihood of return. For 
simplicity, in this model I use democracy to incorporate direct constraints on the 
executive. The results are listed in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 












 Total Provisions 
  
0.0257 
   
(0.0431) 
Democracy 0.497*** 0.465*** 0.467*** 
 
(0.167) (0.176) (0.173) 
Conflict -0.850*** -0.691*** -0.679*** 
 
(0.177) (0.176) (0.178) 
GDP per Capita -0.173** -0.154* -0.150* 
 
(0.0791) (0.0796) (0.0802) 
Constant -11.10*** -11.36*** -11.41*** 
 
(0.556) (0.571) (0.578) 
ln_r 0.545 0.499 0.473 
 
(0.472) (0.464) (0.471) 
ln_s 10.58*** 10.48*** 10.45*** 
 
(0.678) (0.668) (0.682) 
    Observations 248 247 247 
Number of PAID 22 22 22 
Fixed Effects No No No 
Log Likelihood -1655 -1643 -1643 
Chi Square 32.50 23.20 23.21 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





These results suggest support for my hypothesis that direct constraints on the 
executive provide the credible commitment for refugee return as opposed to the 
specific provisions in the refugee agreement. I expected that such refugee agreement 
provisions would not contribute to refugee return because of their lack of credibility.  
 
In Model 1 in Table 5.1, socioeconomic commitments are not significant in 
explaining variation in return. However, holding all else constant, the effect of having 
a democracy results in a 64% increase in the rate of return as compared to non-
democracies. This is significant at the 99% confidence level. In Model 2 of Table 5.1, 
I find that security commitments likewise are not significant in explaining variation in 
return. Again, holding all else constant, the effect of having a democracy results in a 
59% increase in the rate of returns as compared to non-democracies. This is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. In Model 3 in Table 5.1, I find 
that more commitments do not lead to statistically significant greater rates of return. 
Holding all else constant, the effect of having a democracy results in a 60% increase 
in the rate of return as compared to non-democracies. This is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. 
 
Thus, as hypothesized, it is more important to have the institutions that constrain the 
executive directly than it is to have security, socioeconomic, or more total non-
credible provisions included in the refugee agreement. The agreement means nothing 
unless the credibility of the provision is established through strong constraints on the 





As with previous models in Chapter 4, the effect of violence still significantly 
predicts lower rates of return. This is expected. As with the same previous models, 
the effect of increased GDP per capita results in lower rates of return. This is 
unexpected, and may be due to factors including the need for capital to return. 
However, the important result is that constraining institutions cannot be overlooked in 
explaining refugee return rates. While other factors – such as violence – may continue 
to be important, they do not explain the whole story. Commitments made to returnees 
must be credible. 
5.4.2 Assistance Commitments and Legislative Constraints 
I now turn to evaluating provisions in the agreement in the context of legislative 
credible commitments: legislative constraints on the executive. My hypothesis is that 
credible commitments through legislative constraints will lead to greater returnees 
regardless of the type of provision or the amount of provisions in the agreement. 
These models measure the effect of socioeconomic provisions, security provisions, 
and total provisions on the likelihood of return. For simplicity, in this model I use 
opposition vote share as the credible commitment via legislative constraints on the 










  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 












 Total Provisions 
  
-0.0169 
   
(0.0412) 
Opposition Vote Share 0.0148*** 0.0118*** 0.0114*** 
 
(0.00381) (0.00390) (0.00385) 
Conflict -0.835*** -0.660*** -0.660*** 
 
(0.182) (0.175) (0.176) 
GDP per Capita -0.119 -0.210*** -0.200** 
 
(0.0760) (0.0780) (0.0780) 
Constant -11.38*** -10.89*** -10.99*** 
 











    Observations 268 268 268 
Number of PAID 22 23 23 
Fixed Effects Yes No No 
Log Likelihood -1472 -1731 -1731 
Chi Square 41.73 26.49 26.18 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
These results suggest support for my hypothesis. In Model 1 of Table 5.2, 
socioeconomic commitments are not statistically significant. They do not lead to 
increased refugee return. However, holding all else constant, each percentage point 
increase in opposition vote share in the legislature results in a 1% increase in the rate 
of return. This is significant at the 99% confidence level. In Model 2 in Table 5.2, 
security commitments are not statistically significant, as expected. However, holding 




1% increase in the rate of return. This is statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level. In Model 3 in Table 5.2, I find that more specific commitments of assistance do 
not lead to greater levels of return. The total provisions variable is statistically 
insignificant. However, holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in 
opposition vote share leads to a 1% increase in the rate of return. This is significant at 
the 99% confidence level.  These results suggest that the credible commitment 
formed through legislative constraints on the executive is more important at 
explaining increased rates of refugee return than any specific provision type. 
 
In these models – as with the first set – the occurrence of conflict results in 
statistically significant lower rates of return. Furthermore, in models 2 and 3 higher 
GDP per capita leads to lower rates of return. These results are similar to what has 
been found thus far. Again, I emphasize that the important aspect is that constraints 
on the executive appear to explain higher rates of return even when controlling for 
these alternative explanations. This suggests that the importance of constraints on the 
executive cannot be overlooked.  
5.4.3 Assistance Commitments and Power Sharing Constraints 
I now turn to evaluating the aspects of the agreement in terms of credible 
commitments created through power sharing constraints on the executive. My 
hypothesis is that constraints on the executive through power sharing will lead to 
greater returnees regardless of the provision type or the amount of provisions in the 




provisions, and total provisions on the likelihood of return. The results are in Table 
5.3. 
Table 5.3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 












 Total Provisions 
  
-0.0353 
   
(0.0467) 
Power Sharing 0.728*** 0.610*** 0.692*** 
 
(0.192) (0.179) (0.198) 
Conflict -0.935*** -0.797*** -0.845*** 
 
(0.179) (0.178) (0.184) 
GDP per Capita -0.0897 -0.205*** -0.100 
 
(0.0784) (0.0783) (0.0799) 
Constant -11.76*** -10.89*** -11.64*** 
 














    Observations 268 268 267 
Number of PAID 22 23 22 
Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Log Likelihood -1471 -1729 -1460 
Chi Square 39.11 28.18 28.14 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
These results indicate support for my hypothesis. Power sharing institutions provide a 
positive and significant increase in the level of returnees, while the specific assistance 





In Model 1 of Table 5.3, socioeconomic commitments are not significant in 
explaining variation in return. However, holding all else constant, the effect of having 
power sharing arrangements in a post-conflict country results in a 106% increase in 
the rate of return as compared to countries not having power sharing arrangements. 
This is significant at the 99% confidence level. In Model 2 in Table 5.3, security 
commitments are not significant in explaining variation in return. However, holding 
all else constant, the effect of having power sharing arrangements in a post-conflict 
country results in a 84% increase in the rate of return as compared to countries not 
having power sharing arrangements. This is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. In Model 3 in Table 5.3, I find that more provisions of assistance do 
not lead to greater levels of return. Total commitments are statistically insignificant. 
Holding all else constant, the effect of having power sharing arrangements in the 
post-conflict country results in a 100% increase in the rate of return as compared to 
countries that do not have power sharing arrangements. This is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. These results suggest support for my hypothesis that credible 
commitments via power sharing constraints on the executive drive returns rather than 
specific refugee agreement commitments. 
 
As with the previous models, the occurrence of conflict is associated with lower rates 
of return. Increased GDP per capita shows mixed results in these models. However, 
again I emphasize that the constraints via power sharing arrangements hold 
explanatory power even when controlling for these alternative explanations. The 




5.4.4 Assistance Commitments General Model 
I now turn to a general model to isolate the effect of each provision while holding 
constant the others. I also include the different measures of constraint on the 
executive – direct, legislative, and power sharing – so as to isolate those effects. This 
evaluation isolates for the effect of each provision and constraint type. The results are 
found in the Table 5.4 below. 
Table 5.4 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Returnees 
    
Socioeconomic Provisions -0.503 
 
(0.340) 
Security Provisions -0.529* 
 
(0.314) 






Opposition Vote Share 0.0119*** 
 
(0.00435) 


















  Observations 247 
Number of PAID 22 
Fixed Effects No 
Log Likelihood -1633 
Chi Square 46.70 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
Standard errors in parentheses 





These results suggest some support for my hypotheses. I expected that socioeconomic 
commitments, security commitments, and total commitments would not achieve 
statistical significance because they are not credible. Neither socioeconomic nor total 
guarantees reached significance. However, security guarantees appear to have an 
effect when isolating its effect in regard to all other factors. Surprisingly, this effect is 
negative. Holding all else constant, having security guarantees in the agreement 
results in a 41% decrease in the level of returnees. This is significant at the 90% 
confidence level, which is less than what is typically desired. Yet, it suggests that 
perhaps – when considering all other factors – certain commitment types might 
actually lead to less return. This result suggests that perhaps refugees perceive 
provision promises as threats if they are not backed up by democratically constraining 
institutions. Such promises might only signal a regime that is pandering to the 
international community in cases where the constraint types are not present. 
Regardless, the constraint types continue to show some evidence of importance. 
 
I expected that democracy, opposition vote share, and power sharing constraints 
would result in an increase in the level of returnees due to their creation of credible 
commitments towards the provisions listed. Credible commitments via opposition 
vote share and power sharing maintain their statistically significant effects. However, 
it appears that credible commitments via democracy may not be as important in 





Holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in opposition vote share 
results in a 1% increase in the rate of return. This is significant at the 99% confidence 
level, showing strong support for this variable. Meanwhile, the effect of having a 
power sharing arrangement results in a 55% increase in the rate of return, holding all 
else constant. However, this is significant at the 90% confidence level. This is not 
quite as high as is typically accepted, but does show some support for this hypothesis. 
 
Thus, when considered in a general model that isolates the effect of each type of 
constraint, credible commitments are still positive and significant drivers of refugee 
return. While some credible commitment mechanisms provide stronger support than 
others, this fact cannot be overlooked. Contrary to expectations, it appears that 
security commitments might effect the level of return, albeit negatively. Nonetheless, 
the effect of the guarantees does not surpass the 95% confidence level. 
 
From here I turn to an evaluation of these models at the dyad-year level. This allows 
for incorporation of the country of asylum in the model. After the presentation of 
these models, I will discuss the overall results of the effect of the refugee agreement 
provisions. 
5.4.5 Assistance Commitments and Executive Constraints by Dyad 
I now turn to evaluating agreement commitments in terms of direct constraints on the 
executive, when considered between the dyad of asylum and home country. The 
dataset for evaluating these is the same dyad level dataset as used in Chapter 4. The 




the same. However, this time I add the provision variables. The table below 
summarizes the variables used in this evaluation. For further discussion see Chapter 
4. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Returnees 2136 378.80 3787.01 0.00 82000.00 
Refugees 2136 1751.96 14652.69 1.00 352640.00 
Socioeconomic Provisions 2136 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Security Provisions 2136 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Total Provisions 2136 1.03 0.99 0.00 4.00 
Democracy 1796 0.01 0.62 -1.00 1.00 
Executive Electoral 
Competitiveness 2126 -0.69 2.45 -6.00 6.00 
Parties in Legislature 1796 0.04 0.51 -1.00 2.00 
Legislative Electoral 
Competitiveness 2127 -0.43 2.12 -6.00 6.00 
Opposition Vote Share 2128 -6.70 32.81 -83.55 75.10 
Power Sharing 2136 0.68 0.49 -1.00 1.00 
Log GDP per Capita 2123 -2.88 1.68 -6.15 1.87 
Conflict  2136 0.02 0.44 -1.00 1.00 
Distance 2136 52.33 36.90 0.00 191.75 
 
My hypothesis is that credible commitments to refugees in the home country as 
opposed to the country of asylum will lead to greater returnees regardless of the type 
of assistance provision in the refugee agreement or the amount of provisions 
provided. These models measure the effect of socioeconomic provisions, security 
provisions, and total provisions on the likelihood of return between dyads. For 
simplicity, in this model I use democracy as a control to incorporate direct constraints 










  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 








 Total Provisions --- 
 
-0.756*** 
   
(0.199) 
Democracy --- 0.882*** 0.617*** 
  
(0.143) (0.149) 
Conflict --- -0.198 -0.465*** 
  
(0.135) (0.157) 
GDP per Capita --- -0.0170 -0.118 
  
(0.138) (0.121) 
Distance --- 0.0808*** 0.0571*** 
  
(0.0184) (0.0105) 













    Observations 
 
1,789 1,789 









Chi Square  216.1 202.5 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The results show some support for my hypothesis. Model 1 in Table 5.5 would not 
converge. This suggests a number of factors might be affecting the outcome. The 
peace agreement variables do not vary within cases, and because they are measured 
for only the country of origin side of the dyad in these network models, this results in 
a limited number of observations available for the model. Increased observations in 




increased level of zeros in the dependent variable, returnees. A more appropriate 
model may be a zero-inflated negative binomial model, which is explored in the 
appendix to this chapter.  
 
Nonetheless, the models that do converge suggest some support for my hypotheses, 
and suggest that provisions on their own may even provide negative signals to 
refugees. Holding all else constant, security provisions for refugees in peace 
agreements are associated with an 85% decrease in the rate of return, significant at 
the 99% confidence level. This suggests that in the absence of credible commitments 
via institutions that constrain the executive, the provisions themselves may actually 
be seen as a threat to refugees. Returnees perceive that they cannot trust promises that 
are made without credibility. 
 
Meanwhile, the constraining institutions that provide credibility to promises continue 
to lead to refugee return. Holding all else constant, democracy leads to a 142% 
increase in the level of returnees, significant at the 99% confidence level. Again this 
suggests that even if security commitments themselves do not lead to an increase in 
returns, returns are higher when the country of origin makes a credible commitment 
by having greater constraints on the executive than the country of asylum.  
 
In Model 3 in Table 5.5, holding all else constant, more total commitments of 
assistance are associated with a 53% decrease in the level of returnees, significant at 




provide constraints on the executive, such provisions may actually be perceived as a 
threat to refugees. Refugees may perceive that such promises are likely to be broken 
without meaningful constraints on the executive. Holding all else constant, the effect 
of having a democracy is an 85% increase in the rate of return as compared to non-
democracies. This suggests support for my hypothesis that returns are higher when 
the country of origin has greater constraints on the executive than the country of 
asylum – and that this is true regardless of provision type. 
5.4.6 Assistance Commitments and Legislative Constraints by Dyad 
I now turn to evaluating credible commitments to refugee agreements in terms of 
legislative constraints on the executive in the country of origin versus the country of 
asylum. My hypothesis is that greater legislative constraints on the executive in the 
country of origin will lead to greater returnees regardless of the type of provision type 
or the amount of provisions in the agreement. These models measure the effect of 
socioeconomic provision, security provisions, and total provisions on the likelihood 
of return. For simplicity, in this model I use opposition vote share in the legislature in 
the country of origin as compared to the country of asylum to evaluate credible 











  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 












 Total Provisions 
  
-0.486*** 
   
(0.120) 
Opposition Vote Share 0.00994*** 0.0116*** 0.0109*** 
 
(0.00185) (0.00212) (0.00204) 
Conflict -0.939*** -0.509*** -0.719*** 
 
(0.113) (0.171) (0.129) 
GDP per Capita 0.156 0.113 0.0848 
 
(0.0956) (0.106) (0.0998) 
Distance 0.0498*** 0.0608*** 0.0516*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0182) (0.00947) 
Constant -10.18*** -9.047*** -9.567*** 
 
(0.131) (0.240) (0.181) 
ln_r -1.753*** -1.789*** -1.807*** 
 
(0.124) (0.129) (0.123) 
ln_s -1.951*** -2.437*** -2.074*** 
 
(0.369) (0.502) (0.325) 
    Observations 2,118 2,118 2,118 
Number of Dyads 529 529 529 
Fixed Effects No No No 
Log Likelihood -1881 -1868 -1874 
Chi Square 188.9 208.0 198.1 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
These models provide conflicting evidence on the importance of specific provisions 
for refugee return. In Model 1 of Table 5.6, holding all else constant, the effect of 
having socioeconomic guarantees in the refugee agreement is a 146% increase in the 
rate of return. This is significant at the 90% confidence level, which is lower than is 
typically accepted. However, it suggests some doubt that socioeconomic provisions 




point increase in opposition vote share is a 1% increase in the rate of return. This is 
significant at the 99% confidence level. This suggests that regardless of the 
socioeconomic commitment, the level of legislative constraint on the executive in the 
country of origin is an important factor in predicting refugee return. 
 
For Models 2 and 3, I again find that provisions actually lead to a decrease in the 
level of returns. As discussed, this could be due to the perception that governments 
are unable to keep their promises without credible commitments via institutions. In 
Model 2 in Table 5.6, holding all else constant, having security provisions in the 
refugee agreement leads to a 78% decrease in the rate of return. This is significant at 
the 99% confidence level. However, opposition vote share also continues to be 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Each percentage point increase in 
opposition vote share is associated with about a 1% increase in the rate of return, 
holding all else equal. This again suggests that rather than security commitments 
resulting in higher return, greater legislative constraints in the country of origin lead 
to higher levels of return. In fact, security provisions in the absence of credible 
institutions may discourage refugees from returning. 
 
In Model 3 in Table 5.6, a greater number of provisions for refugee assistance leads 
to a 38% decrease in the rate of return, holding all else constant. This is significant at 
the 99% confidence level. Again, opposition vote share maintains its statistical 
significance at the 99% confidence level, leading to a 1% increase in the rate of return 




lead to higher rates of return. Instead, having greater legislative constraints in the 
country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum leads to greater returns. This 
again emphasizes that the commitment must be credible. Indeed, without credible 
commitments, increased provisions for assistance may discourage return. 
 
5.4.7 Assistance Commitments and Power Sharing by Dyad 
I now turn to evaluating credible commitments to the refugee agreement in terms of 
power sharing constraints on the executive. My hypothesis is that greater power 
sharing constraints on the executive in the country of origin as opposed to the country 
of asylum will lead to a higher level of returnees regardless of the type of 
commitment or the amount of commitments in the agreement. These models measure 
the effect of socioeconomic provisions, security provisions, and total provisions on 
the likelihood of return. I use power sharing as the constraint on the executive. These 














  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Returnees Returnees Returnees 












 Total Provisions 
  
-0.437*** 
   
(0.122) 
Power Sharing 0.260* 0.112 0.112 
 
(0.139) (0.145) (0.137) 
Conflict -1.118*** -0.771*** -0.905*** 
 
(0.106) (0.149) (0.126) 
GDP per Capita 0.117 0.0526 0.0460 
 
(0.0956) (0.104) (0.100) 
Distance 0.0466*** 0.0561*** 0.0492*** 
 
(0.00996) (0.0120) (0.00903) 
Constant -10.20*** -9.155*** -9.570*** 
 
(0.143) (0.245) (0.202) 
ln_r -1.760*** -1.802*** -1.817*** 
 
(0.125) (0.123) (0.123) 
ln_s -2.033*** -2.476*** -2.180*** 
 
(0.358) (0.349) (0.305) 
    Observations 2,123 2,123 2,123 
Number of Dyads 531 531 531 
Fixed Effects No No No 
Log Likelihood -1904 -1894 -1899 
Chi Square 173.7 202.0 188.5 
Cross-sectional time-series negative binomial models (xtnbreg) 
 Dependent variable is count of returnees 
Exposure(Refugees) 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
This model provides some support for my hypothesis that commitments must be 
credible to drive refugee return. Socioeconomic provisions in the refugee agreement 
are not statistically significant at predicting refugee return. However, power sharing 
leads to a 30% increase in the rate of return, holding all else constant. This is 




confidence level, but does provide some evidence that power sharing matters more 
than socioeconomic provisions for encouraging returns.  
 
As with the previous table, Models 2 and 3 show that specific provisions may 
discourage returns. In Model 2, security commitments lead to a 73% decrease in the 
rate of return, holding all else constant. This is significant at the 99% confidence 
level. This again suggests that security commitments without constraining 
government institutions to provide credible commitments might actually discourage 
returns. In this model, power sharing is not statistically significant. While the effect of 
power sharing goes away when considering security provisions, the security 
provisions themselves do not lead to increased return. 
 
In Model 3 in Table 5.7, more provisions of refugee assistance lead to a 35% decrease 
in the rate of return, holding all else constant. This is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. This suggests that without credible commitments to uphold the 
provisions via government institutions that constrain the executive, refugees may 
actually be discouraged from returning even when promises are made. Such promises 
are not credible and may even be seen as a threat. In Model 3, power sharing loses its 
significance as well. The credible commitment made via power sharing loses its 
explanatory effect when considered in terms of the total number of commitments 





Considered in these models, the effect of the control variables remains much the same 
as before. Occurrence of violence leads to less returns, and increased distance leads to 
greater returns. GDP per capita is not overwhelmingly influential for returns in these 
models. However, a new trend is emerging: some provision types may lead to a 
decrease in rates of return when holding constraint type constant. This suggests not 
that constraints do not matter, but in fact they may be specific signals not to return if 
they are not backed up by the credibility of constraints on the executive.  
 
5.4.8 Assistance Commitments and Constraints by Dyad – General Model 
The dyad-level data does not allow me to consider a model in which I can isolate for 
the effect of each provision type and constraint type. With all explanatory variables 
present in the model, the model will not converge using the previous model 
parameters. This emphasizes the importance of model specification. As mentioned, 
this could be due to the low number of observations, the lack of within-country 
variation in peace agreements, and the lack of data on promises made in the asylum 
country. This results in a large number of zeros in the data. In the appendix, I address 
these issues using zero-inflated negative binomial models to account for over-
inflation of zeros and the resultant lack of variation across dyads in the dependent 
variable.  
5.5 Discussion 
The results of this chapter show some support for my hypotheses. While it makes 
intuitive sense that provision commitments should be a major draw for refugees when 




specific commitments in the agreement. Instead, returns are more likely to occur 
when strong institutional constraints are placed on the executive, creating a credible 
commitment. 
 
The results in the general model at the country level (5.4.4) show that some 
constraints on the executive may have a stronger influence than others. While the loss 
of significance for the democracy variable casts some doubt on that constraint, the 
continued significance of opposition vote share and power sharing arrangements 
suggest overall support for the hypothesis that constraints on the executive leads to 
higher levels of return. 
 
In the results of the models at the dyad level, a trend began to emerge where some 
provisions actually led to decreased rates of returns when controlling for constraint 
type. This suggests stronger evidence that provision types are not the answer. 
Provisions and the promises that they hold must be backed up with credibility 
provided by constraints placed on the executive that will punish broken promises. 
 
Thus, I can conclude that specific commitments within refugee agreements are not a 
significant driver of return. While it makes intuitive sense that commitments would 
provide incentive for refugees to return, this is not always the case because they lack 
credibility. Security, socioeconomic, and total number of commitments were not 
significant predictors of increased rates of return in the models in this chapter. Indeed, 




more than provision type is that the provisions are enforced through institutional 




Chapter 6: The Journey Home and Beyond 
6.1 Conclusion: Credible Commitments and Executive Constraints 
I argued that political institutions that place constraints on the executive create a 
credible commitment for executives to create the conditions required for durable 
return, and provide a signal to refugees that the return investment is worthwhile. The 
empirical evidence provides general support for this argument. While other factors 
such as the end to violence and economic opportunity are important – the existence of 
credible commitments cannot be overlooked. Additionally, I found that specific 
commitments in the refugee agreement are not as important as the credibility of the 
commitment.  
 
The results as pertaining to the effect of direct elections show general support for my 
hypothesis. The models show a positive effect on the level of return in democracies 
when measured at the country-year and dyad-year level. These results hold even in 
the general models that isolate the effect of democracy with other forms of constraint. 
Additionally, when establishing whether specific provision types mattered for 
increasing refugee return, democracy continued to show some significance. However, 
when considering credible commitment type in the general model at the country-year 
level it was not significant. The overall picture suggests fairly strong support for the 
idea that having direct constraint on the executive is tied to refugee return. In most 
models, the constraints placed on the executive via direct elections led to higher rates 




the promises made by the regime, and that this signaled to refugees that return was a 
viable option.  
6.2 Conclusion: Legislative Constraints 
The results as pertaining to the effect of legislative constraints on the executive also 
show general support for my hypotheses. Countries that have an increased opposition 
vote share in the legislature, or an increased level of competition in the legislature – 
result in greater levels of refugee return. At the country level, the legislative 
constraints proved to be significant predictors of refugee return. This held true even in 
the model that isolated the different commitment types. At the dyad level, the 
legislative constraints proved to be significant predictors of refugee return.  
 
These results remain as expected when considering commitment types. The 
commitment types do not predict higher rates of refugee return, while higher levels of 
opposition vote share continue to predict refugee returns. Overall this suggests 
support for the argument that legislative constraints provide the type of credibility to 
the promises that governments make regarding returnees. With increased 
independence and power of opposition in the legislature, the promises that are made 
by the regime-owners cannot be broken without repercussion. With this mechanism in 
play, refugees return at higher rates when opposition legislatures hold more power.  
6.3 Conclusion: Power Sharing Constraints 
The power sharing constraints on the executive provided some explanatory power, 




sharing arrangement was a statistically and substantively significant predictor of 
refugee return. This result held even in the general model that isolated the effect of 
each type of executive constraint. However, the effect of power sharing when 
considered in the dyad model was not as straightforward. While significant in the 
individual model, the effect in the general model was not a significant predictor of 
higher refugee return rates.  
 
Interestingly, when considering the effect of power sharing in regard to refugee 
agreement commitment types – the effect of power sharing was a significant predictor 
of refugee return across all models. Regardless of commitment type, power sharing 
was a significant predictor of refugee return at both the country level and dyad level. 
This result held even in the general models that isolated the effect of each constraint 
type. Thus, I maintain that credible commitments through power sharing cannot be 
overlooked in explaining refugee return. 
6.4 Conclusion: Mechanisms 
Constraining institutions encourage two separate factors that lead to higher refugee 
return. First, constraining institutions create a credible commitment to follow through 
on the refugee agreement. While a government may sign a peace agreement 
supporting the policy of creating conditions for return for refugees, they are free to 
renege on this policy once they have taken power. However, in the context of 
constraining institutions, this ability to renege becomes less likely. The cost of 




ability of the legislature to block policies or hold the executive accountable, and the 
ability of veto players to stop reneging.  
 
As a result, when constraining institutions exist, we are more likely to see policies 
created that result in positive conditions for durable return. Such was the case in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia – the illustrative cases in which the government created 
committees and funds that were tasked with handling refugee return.  
 
Secondly, constraining institutions create a signal to refugees that are abroad. When 
peace breaks out, refugees may desire return. However, if the political situation 
signals that the leader of the country will be held accountable, refugees will use this 
information in their decision to return. Refugees will not seek to stay in an asylum 
country that is uncertain when they could return home to a more certain treatment. 
Further, refugees will stay in the country of asylum or resettle elsewhere when they 
find that the political institutions at home do not commit to creating the conditions for 
durable return. 
 
The illustrative cases in Chapter 3 provided evidence of these mechanisms. The 
existence of constraining institutions was directly tied to the creation of committees 
and strategies for addressing the conditions of refugee return. In Sierra Leone, the 
institutions allowed for the inclusion of interests that desired the creation of the 
conditions of return for refugees. However, in Djibouti, the lack of institutions that 




through without consequence. This provides an example of a regime that broke its 
promise. Without institutions to punish, there was no consequence for doing so. The 
evidence from the statistical analysis largely backed these intuitions.   
6.4 Policy Implications 
The implications of this research can inform policy decisions. Policy makers might 
better address refugee crises if focus is placed not only on ending the conflict, but on 
creating credible commitments to refugees that their needs will be addressed. Policy 
makers can support institutions that credibly commit governments to creating the 
conditions necessary for return. Without tending to these issues, policy makers may 
miss a large driver of returns.  
 
Largely, the findings suggest that refugee return is subject to factors that might be 
outside the control of NGOs and policy makers seeking to address refugee crises. 
However, understanding the realities should provide grounds for better addressing the 
needs of returnees. If peace is seen not as the only end but an important first step, 
then policy makers can make sure to aim focus towards specific returnee needs in the 
aftermath of conflict.  
 
Post-conflict peacebuilding can focus not only on peacekeepers that deliver security 
or economic investment for rebuilding that produces growth, but such peace builders 
can also focus on projects that create credible commitments for returnees. Much focus 




focus on the credible commitments that foster durable returns, policy makers may 
better be able to assist citizens and to succeed in alleviating displacement. 
6.5 Durable Solutions to Refugee Crises: Challenges and Future Research 
The journey home is an important aspect of refugee crises that deserves more 
widespread attention. Often the focus is on addressing the needs of refugees in 
refugee camps or as world countries seek to resettle them. When return is discussed, it 
is often in terms of ending the conflict. This project has shown that ending the 
conflict is only the first step in fostering refugee return. Thus, durable solutions to 
refugee crises must focus not only on ending conflicts, but also on establishing 
institutional conditions that will enable for refugee inclusion in society and for the 
creation of conditions that address refugee needs. Here I briefly discuss further 
challenges that face those seeking to assist returnees, and how future research might 
address it. 
Reintegration 
Achieving a larger level of refugee returns is only the first step in creating durable 
solutions for displacement. Even after return, and in the context of government 
assistance, reintegration can be difficult. Often, return can result in only further 
internal displacement within the home country, as returnees have trouble reintegrating 
and resettling. Observers note that until recently the UNHCR often measured 
“success” in terms of “timely provision of physical transportation and relocation of 
exiles rather than the subsequent process of reintegrating them into society” (Arowolo 




under which and the community in which returnees live (Arowolo 2000). Future 
research might focus on this ability to reintegrate. 
 
In recent years, policy makers have made such concerns their focus. In 2004 the 
UNHCR released a handbook outlining activities that would enable durable returns. 
The UNHCR recommends that four main categories be addressed: physical safety, 
legal safety, material safety, and reconciliation (UNHCR 2004). This research project 
finds that constraining institutions are more likely to result in higher return because of 
a commitment to create these conditions. However, the existence of these conditions 
can use more study as additional data becomes available.  
 
Data regarding the conditions that returnees experience is often difficult without 
tracking each returnee. Yet it is often difficult to track the status of individuals as they 
return back to the country, due to the lack of services and nature of such movements. 
Further, such tracking is likely to be expensive. Perhaps as data becomes more 
available, this challenge can be met. However, alternatives might exist. Community 
level data could be used to examine the conditions that are generally applied to the 
areas of return. Thus, data gathered on public services and public opinion may be 
valuable for meeting this challenge. Future research could help to predict where 
governments are best able to deliver services, and where returnees are best able to 
rebuild their livelihoods. Gaining an understanding of this process will allow policy 






Additionally, return is not always the most favorable option. This research has noted 
that without proper institutions, refugees do not and perhaps should not return home. 
This presents a policy challenge as governments must then seek to do what is best for 
refugees. Often, policy makers urge refugees to return home even when conditions 
are not best for return (Fagen 2011). Sometimes the only source of services is from 
the international community, as governments do not provide economic, security or 
basic services (Fagen 2011).  
 
Returns may also exacerbate problems, which should be the focus of future research. 
Some evidence suggests that returns – when done in suboptimal conditions – 
contribute to only further strains on the government. For example, in Afghanistan, a 
country with suboptimal conditions for returnees – corruption and lack of rule of law 
is widespread, security has deteriorated, shelter is scarce, disputes over land 
ownership have grown, and internal displacement is common as returnees struggle to 
earn a living (Schmeidl and Maley 2008).  
 
This project has provided an initial step towards understanding refugee returns. It 
seeks to examine the conditions under which refugees are more likely to return. Yet it 
does little to address the rest of the process: how returnees reintegrate following their 





While this project found that commitments lacked meaning with credible 
commitments, left unanswered is how commitments backed by credible institutions 
can best improve returnee lives. Future research may examine the types of 
government programs that are best able to address returnee concerns. Future research 
should help returnee programs to predict returnee needs and supply the tools 
necessary to those assisting returnees. Programs in this regard can consist of giving 
assistance to returnees until such a time as they can rebuild, and the development of 
urban planning and development strategies to deal with an influx in people and 
economic opportunities in both rural and urban areas. Such programs need to have a 
long-term focus. Too often, the focus is on the short-term emergency while the long-
term strategy for integration is ignored (Fagen 2011).  
6.6 Conclusion 
The world of refugees is a difficult one. Refugees face problems ranging from the 
humanitarian to the political. This dissertation hopes to address some of the political 
difficulties that refugees face on their journey home. With an increased focus on the 
ability of governments to deliver services to returnees including physical, economic, 
and social securities – the resolution to crises of displacement is more likely to be 
effective and efficient.  
 
Margaret Levi notes that one of the defining problems in modern political science is 
how to build effective governments (2006). She notes that we are particularly adept at 
explaining how governments break down, but that we lack a complete understanding 




“transform governments that have failed their citizens abysmally into governments 
that protect their citizens, provide them with health, education, infrastructure and 
other public goods” (Levi 2006, 6). It is with this concern that I hope to have made a 
contribution. By examining the models that show increased return – I am defining a 
model that explains how governments can turn from one that was unable to 
accomplish its most basic task – protecting its citizens – to one that encourages these 
same citizens to return and creates the conditions that allow them to rebuild their 
livelihoods. 
 
Protecting refugees is one of the most basic tasks that post-conflict governments can 
do. Refugees are among the world’s most vulnerable people. Fleeing death, many 
refugees face difficulty in finding conditions that allow for their livelihood. Perhaps 
with an increased focus on durable solutions to refugee crises, data-backed solutions 






In Chapter 3, Figure 3.3 depicts returnees as a proportion of refugees. However, for 
sake of clarity I omitted cases where there were more returnees than refugees in a 
country-year. However, this did occur in some cases. This might occur due to a 
higher level of refugees that were created and returned during the year – since returns 
are measured as total returns over the year, and stock is measured as total refugees at 
the end of the year. This is not the general trend, but a few cases like this exist. The 
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Returnees as a dependent variable contain many instances of zero. This is due to the 
fact that – while many refugees exist outside the country – return does not always 
occur. Sometimes it occurs in very large numbers, and sometimes it is slow and 
steady. Yet, overall there is often a large proportion of the time that returns are zero. 
In my country-level dataset, zero makes up 38% of the density of returnees. In the 
dyad-level dataset, zero makes up 90% of the density of returnees. This high level of 
zeros – particularly in the dyad-level dataset – can cause problems. As I added more 
variables to the dyad-level dataset in Chapter 5, some models began not to converge. 
This could be due to the over-inflation of zeros. To correct for this, a zero-inflated 
negative binomial model can be used. In this appendix, I explore a few of the key 
models using zero-inflated negative binomial models. 
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial models specify two models. The first model, labeled 
“Inflate” is the model predicting the likelihood of being almost a “certain-zero”. 
Given this, the model then predicts the rate of return given those who are not 
predicted to be certain-zeros. The intuition behind this is explained by the following 
example. Consider counts of daily cigarette usage. Many respondents have zero, yet 
some cases are because the respondent never smokes, while other cases are because 
the smoker did not smoke that day. Zero-inflated negative binomial models aim to 
predict the people who never smoke, so as to more accurately predict the counts 
among the overall population. In fact, zero-inflated negative binomial models are 





To specify the model predicting zero, I included the main explanatory factors that I 
hypothesized would result in refugee return: executive constraint, violence, economic 
opportunity, and in the case of dyads – distance. Then I specified the model 
predicting rate of return. In this model I hypothesized that in addition to these 
variables, the amount of return in the previous year and the overall number of 
refugees available would influence rate of return. So rate of return model includes 
these variables. 
 
Upon use of the zero-inflated negative binomial models, the results of my hypotheses 
are quite mixed. In some cases general support is provided, but in others significance 
drops. In some cases the opposite is suggested. In future research, these models will 
be explored. Here I present some highlights of the zero-inflated negative binomial 
models. 
 
First I consider constraints in both country-year and dyad-year models, as I explored 
in Chapter 4. In this appendix, I use opposition vote share for exploration because it is 
perhaps the most central form of constraint on the executive. Elections may not 
present an immediate or definite punishment for reneging. Power sharing 
arrangements may vary in their ability to provide direct punishment for reneging. Yet, 
opposition vote share has the potential for immediate punishment for broken promises 
and the ability to veto attempts to renege by the executive. Thus, consider the 





  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Inflate Returnees 
      
Opposition Vote Share -0.0165** 0.000395 
 
(0.00839) (0.00710) 
Conflict -1.455*** 0.320 
 
(0.561) (0.313) 













Constant -1.406 11.04*** 
 
(0.855) (0.764) 
   Observations 338 338 
Log Likelihood -2332 -2332 
Chi Square 117.7 117.7 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model (zinb) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Both models can be interpreted with exponentiation of the coefficient. The first model 
predicts the likelihood of not being a returnee. Holding all else constant, each 
percentage point increase in opposition vote share in the legislature leads to a 2% 
decrease in the likelihood of not being a returnee. This is significant at the 95% 
confidence level. In other words, increased opposition vote share leads to a 
significantly greater chance that one will be a returnee. This supports my hypothesis. 
As for the rate of return, opposition vote share is not a significant predictor of rate of 
return. This does not support my hypothesis. Yet, the fact that one is more likely to be 
a returnee shows some promise. 
 
The same result holds when considered at the dyad-level. Using the dyad-year dataset 




results again indicate that opposition vote share in the country of origin as opposed to 
the country of asylum increases one’s chance of being a returnee, but does not have 
explanatory power for rate of return. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Inflate Returnees 
      
Opposition Vote Share -0.0334*** 0.00162 
 
(0.00777) (0.00606) 
Conflict 1.351 -1.260* 
 
(1.234) (0.685) 
GDP per Capita -1.118*** 0.220 
 
(0.247) (0.180) 













Constant -3.441*** 3.811*** 
 
(0.687) (0.315) 
   Observations 1,567 1,567 
Log Likelihood -1224 -1224 
Chi Square 192.9 192.9 
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Model 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in vote share of the 
opposition in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum results in a 
3% decrease in the probability of not being a returnee. This is significant at the 99% 
confidence level. In other words, increase in opposition vote share results in a 3% 
increase in the probability of being a returnee. However, increase in opposition vote 
share does not lead to a significantly greater rate of return. 
 
I now highlight some findings related to provision type at the country-year and dyad-




regard to all three types of constraint types. I specified these models similar to the 
first two in this appendix, except I added the provision type. 
 
At the country-level, socioeconomic provisions provide explanatory power for neither 
the probability of being a returnee nor the rate of return. However, democracy and 
opposition vote share hold some explanatory power.  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Inflate Returnees 
      
Socioeconomic Provisions -0.0140 -0.239 
 
(0.375) (0.330) 
Democracy 0.425 0.758** 
 
(0.377) (0.363) 
Opposition Vote Share -0.0288* -0.0101 
 
(0.0153) (0.00836) 
Power Sharing -0.512 -0.266 
 
(0.366) (0.301) 
Conflict -1.727*** 0.267 
 
(0.670) (0.358) 













Constant -1.460 10.95*** 
 
(1.028) (0.825) 
   Observations 317 317 
Log Likelihood -2228 -2228 
Chi Square 113.4 113.4 
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Model 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The effect of having a democracy on the probability of being a returnee is not 
significant. However, holding all else equal, the effect of having a democracy results 
in a 113% increase in the rate of return as compared to non-democracies. This is 




each percentage point increase in opposition vote share results in a 3% decrease in the 
likelihood of not being a returnee. This is significant at the 90% confidence level. 
This is below conventional confidence levels, but provides some weaker support for 
the idea that increased opposition vote share leads to a greater likelihood of being a 
returnee. 
 
I then evaluate this same model in regard to the dyad-level dataset. This evaluates the 
same set of provisions and constraints as the previous models except that all variables 
– with the exception of socioeconomic guarantees – are measured as a difference 
between origin and asylum countries. The results are as follows: 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Inflate Returnees 
      
Socioeconomic Provisions 7.857*** -0.108 
 
(2.148) (2.593) 
Democracy -1.295** -0.774* 
 
(0.516) (0.432) 
Opposition Vote Share -0.0209** 0.0109 
 
(0.00878) (0.00760) 
Power Sharing 0.194 -0.281 
 
(0.526) (0.464) 
Conflict 2.338* -0.989 
 
(1.296) (0.724) 
GDP per Capita -0.971*** 0.343* 
 
(0.245) (0.179) 













Constant -3.041*** 4.643*** 
 
(0.786) (0.511) 
   Observations 1,335 1,335 
Log Likelihood -1109 -1109 
Chi Square 176.1 176.1 
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Models 
 Standard errors in parentheses 






Holding all else equal, the effect of socioeconomic guarantees in the refugee 
agreement results in a 2582% increase in the likelihood of not being a returnee. This 
is significant at the 99% confidence level. Such substantively and statistically high 
result suggests that socioeconomic guarantees are very much associated with not 
being a returnee when controlling for constraint types. This again suggests support for 
the hypothesis that promises made in the absence of the right political institutions are 
perceived to be false promises or perhaps even threats to returnees. And as 
hypothesized, the inclusion of socioeconomic guarantees has no effect on the rate of 
return. 
 
Both democracy and opposition vote share result in statistically significant 
probabilities of being a returnee. Holding all else constant, the effect of having a 
democracy in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum results in a 
23% decrease in the likelihood of being a returnee. This is significant at the 95% 
confidence level. In other words, democracy leads to a statistically significant chance 
of being a returnee. This supports my hypothesis. However, the model suggests that 
democracy results in a lower rate of return. Holding all else constant, the effect of 
having a democracy in the country of origin as opposed to the country of asylum 
results in a 54% decrease in the rate of return. 
 
Holding all else constant, each percentage point increase in opposition vote share 




the 95% confidence level. In other words, each percentage point increase is associated 
with a 2% increase in the probability of being a returnee. This supports my 
hypothesis. However, opposition vote share is not associated with a statistically 
significant increase in the rate of return. This does not support my hypothesis. 
 
Most of the results follow this trend. Ultimately, there is tentative support for my 
hypotheses, but some mixed results. It appears that constraining institutions are 
associated with refugee return at some level – whether it is the probability of being a 
returnee, or the rate of return. Future research should explore these trends, using the 


















I coded data from text of Peace Agreements using the Peace Agreement Matrix and 
supplementing with the UCDP Peace Agreement Database when necessary. Below is 







IDREF: Did the agreement define who counts as a refugee? 
 0: no 
 1: yes 
 
RETOWN: Did returnees own the process? Agreement specifies they will have 
input? 
 0: no 
 1: yes 
 
I: ASSISTANCE GUARANTEES 
 
AGUN: Assistance Guarantees: Unspecified. Is “assistance” listed but not specified? 
 0: no 
 1: yes 
 
AGFIN: Assistance Guarantees: Financial 
1. Coded 1 if assistance is monetary: returnees get actual money 
 
AGPROP: Assistance Guarantees: Property 
1. Coded 1 if assistance is in terms of property: they actually give or assist in 
attaining property 
 
AGPOL: Assistance Guarantees: Political/legal 
1. Coded 1 if assistance is given in terms of establishing political rights for 
returnees, including legal citizenship 
 
AGDOCS : Guarantees: Documents 
1. 1 if yes 
 
AGAMN: Assistance Guarantees: /justice/amnesty 
1. Coded 1 if assistance is in terms of legal/justice/amnesty 
 
AGSEC: Assistance Guarantees: Security 





AGRESACC: Assistance Guarantees: Resource Access 
1. Coded 1 if assistance is in terms of access to resources: water, food, farming, 
education 
 





OBSEC: objective: security 
 
 
OBRET: Objective: Return 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective of agreement is for refugees to return to country of 
origin 
 
OBREINT: Objective: Reintegration 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective of agreement is for refugees to reintegrate in the 
country 
 
OBRESTL: Objective: Resettlement 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective of agreement is for refugees to resettle in the 
country 
 
OBPROP: Objective: Property Restitution 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective of agreement is for refugees to get restitution for 
property 
 
OBRECONC: Objective: Reconciliation 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective of agreement is for reconciliation among returnees 
 
OBQUAL: Objective: Quality of Life 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective of agreement is for improved quality of life for 
returnees 
 
OBCHOI: Objective: give refugees a choice of where to return to 
1. Coded 1 if stated objective is to give refugees free choice of where to return 
 
IMPCOM: Implementation Commission 
1. Coded 1 if states commission to oversee implementation 
	  
IMP3P: Implementation 3rd party 
1. Coded 1 if implementation will be assisted by 3rd party 
 
TTABLE: Time Table 
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